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¬¬PHANTOMS IN SCIENCE: NIETZSCHE’S 
NONOBJECTIVITY ON PLANCK’S QUANTA 
Honors Thesis 
D. Richard Dickerson III 
drdickersoniii@gmail.com 
Abstract 
What does Maxwell Planck's concept of phantomness suggest about the epistemological basis of 
science and how might a Nietzschean critique reveal solution to the weaknesses revealed? With 
his solution to Kirchoff's equation, Maxwell Planck launched the paradigm of quantum physics. This 
same solution undermined much of current understandings of science versus pseudoscience. 
Using Nietzsche's perspectivism and other philosophical critiques, Planck's answer to blackbody 
radiation is used to highlight the troubles with phantom problems in science and how to try to direct 
science towards a more holistic and complete scientific approach. 
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PHANTOMS IN SCIENCE: NIETZSCHE’S NONOBJECTIVITY ON PLANCK’S 
QUANTA 
INTRODUCTION 
The current understanding of science relies on stark contrasts between physics and metaphysics. 
Current science requires that there be science and pseudoscience to function. However, it is 
possible there is more of a blending of these two realms than has been previously thought under 
orthodox belief. The revolution brought about with Kuhn’s work significantly changed the way 
science was viewed without changing the way it was practiced.  
 Now, in light of Copenhagen quantum physics, questions may once again be raised as to 
the validity of the growing distinction of science versus pseudoscience, and fact versus fiction, 
with the increasingly obvious nature of nonobjectivity. Specifically, reductionist science tends to 
refute ideas by establishing the necessity for certain truths of the reduced field. With this in 
mind, the quandary of quantum physics once again rears its head to provide a narrative, if not an 
exact answer, to this development in science. 
 Herein, the idea of phantom problems as established by Planck’s work in quantum 
physics may be used to reasonably understand scientific functioning in the world of reductionist 
necessary truths. But, this alone provides an unclear picture without practical application. 
Therefore, Nietzsche, a thinker who developed perspectivism and ultimately pioneered 
nonobjectivity in the modern age, can be appropriated to better understand the picture painted by 
Planck’s thoughts. This interpretation gives an account of science such that the question of what 
science is can perhaps be explicated. Moreover, this interpretation gives an accounting of that 
narrative such that it may require a drastic change in science’s outlook to allow it to continue 
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functioning with the same authoritative voice. Specifically, by exploring the concept of 
nonobjectivity in science and scientific exploration, the question of objective law will be exposed 
so as to interrogate the basis of science at its core and then re-establish it in a contemporary 
Nietzschean philosophical light to once again give the discipline meaning. 
Philosophy and Science 
To properly discuss the nature of science, and specifically its limitations and direct link to error, a 
brief understanding of the historical conception of science's ontological and epistemological 
foundations is necessary. Due to the semantic changes over the course of the past 3 centuries, this 
explanation will remain limited to a discussion of the two major branches that will play a role 
throughout the rest of the discussion and certain widespread theories, as a full study of even one 
thinker in the field could require a lifetime's work. Still, it is possible to encapsulate the general 
understanding without requiring intimate exploration of every thinker to date. 
 The timeline then may be represented from the beginning of so called “rational thought” 
(rationalism) to the current presupposed end point of postmodernism—though the claim will be 
made later that this end point is drastically misjudged. This timeline is best suggested by an 
exploration of rationalism, realism, positivism, negativism, postpostivism, and postmodernism. 
These modes of thought may seen to, in different ways, support either the naturalistic or 
humanistic perspective of science. Therefore, a discussion of naturalism and humanism in 
science is here given in brief to allow for a broader picture of the argument of objectivity and 
nonobjectivity. 
 




 To put scientific theory into a naturalistic category, a working definition of scientific 
naturalism is necessary. Naturalism, in brief, is the presupposition that the world and the 
phenomena of the world can be explained by natural means and forces. This arose from early 
empiricism coupled with objectivism. Put simply, everything has observable natural components. 
To explain reality, it is these components that can and must be analyzed. Anything that is either 
unobservable or supranatural is in direct opposition to this theory. 
 This can be understood by Mounce's explanation of the difficulty of empirical perception 
versus natural causation (1999). Since, Mounce claims, the empiricist views reality by the 
senses, the natural causes determined are naturally determined largely by the senses (1999). 
Empiricism, the method by which naturalism can be determined, relies upon thought, which will 
resurface when Kantian anti-realism is discussed. Naturalism can then be thought of in two parts: 
strict scientific naturalism and sensational naturalism. The latter of these may be seen to be 
Griffin's minimal naturalism with modification, wherein the acceptance of the human aspect 
allows some uncertainty to enter into the natural world (2004). 
 Sensational naturalism, in this respect, concerns itself with natural explanations of 
unnatural observance. The supranatural are still outside the realms of exploration in this, but it is 
implicit that there may be occurrences which cannot be readily understood. These noumena of 
being still produce phenomena, but we may perceive only the phenomena and not the noumena. 
Sensational naturalism allows for, in some respect, a social dimension of science. 
 Strict naturalism however, may be seen in stark contrast to sensational naturalism. The 
strict naturalism, as shown by both Griffin (2004) and Farber (1968), is much more at odds with 
the supernatural. In the strictest of this tradition, it is not simply divine or otherworldly aspects 
that are called into question but the nature of the psychological and human elements of the 
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system itself. Strict naturalism ignores the human dimension, instead focusing on the phenomena 
of the world as being explicitly understood in and of themselves. This can be seen in modern 
work by Michele, who spends some length defending against Kantian anti-realism (2013) to 
show that the properties of the world are themselves independent of human thought and 
understanding (2016). This strict naturalism, discounts sketpicism in its many forms to favor 
worldly understanding. In its absolute strictest form, even human interaction is denied as a factor 
of understanding. It is assumed herein, that strict naturalism can explain the world and its 
properties as is and that such properties are relatively unchanging compared to the great 
variability in the heretofore defined social dimension (that which contains the human, 
sociological, psychological, and otherwise empirically indescribable). 
 
Humanism and Science 
 
 This may be contrasted against the humanist view. Naturalism, which is a byproduct of 
early enlightenment thought, holds that the natural world is easily explained in worldly ways. 
Humanism holds quite the opposite. Humanism may instead be understood as the position 
holding that much of what is understood is only understood conditionally. Or, more simply, that 
the social dimension more greatly impacts what we know, can know, and will know than the 
truth of reality. 
 In this view, humanism is a stark opposite to strict naturalism but holds some common 
ground with sensational naturalism. However, humanism, like naturalism, should be broken into 
two separate modes of thought. 
 A more liberal humanism holds that perceivable reality exists independently of the human 
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aspect. This perceivable reality may or may not be what one believes it to be. Instead, the 
perceptions of it are simply that. These perceptions may be correct, but the truths one comes to 
know about an object are dependent on social dimension. This may be understood best through 
Kuhnian paradigmism (2015). It may also be demonstrated by the academic science 
demonstrated in Holster's work (2016). Thus, one may say, that liberal humanism holds that 
certain truths are more truthful or more valuable than other truths, and that objective truth is 
simply popular subjective truth. 
 A more strict humanism, however, would hold that truth itself is of human construction. 
All truth is subjective. This then gives reality over entirely to a social dimension. While this type 
of humanism will not be explored in depth in this work, it will be discussed peripherally to 
explain the responses by science against this. To use the example once again, Kantian anti-
realism, which holds that we never perceive the noumena, would fall solidly into this 
categorization. 
 Of final remark to humanistic definition, one cannot escape the explanation and 
definition of categorization itself. Since categorization is itself a human endeavor, the simple act 
of categorization (and thus taxonomy as a whole) can only be understood as a humanistic pursuit. 
Thus, this work itself cannot avoid the humanistic categorization and that must be acknowledged 
upfront. In so far as categories are helpful, they are not of themselves reality. The act of 
categorization that has and will occur throughout this work are themselves a point of critique, 
which will be further discussed at the conclusion. 
 
 
Basic Principles of Scientific Methodology 
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 To first answer the question about the meaning of science and whether or not it is 
humanistic or naturalistic, however, it is first necessary to understand the idea of science. Then, a 
broader definition can be established such that the current understanding of objectivity in 
scientific pursuits can be properly explored. Unfortunately, contemporary understandings of 
science involve not a single idea but several foundational concepts and principles that underlie 
current scientific practice and thought. The inevitable conclusions of these precepts are 
inextricable from the foundation. Thus, a brief view and understanding of the core of modern 
science, in both a theoretical and practical sense, is necessary. To determine whether science 
may be considered historically humanistic, as Kuhn would suggest (2015), or naturalistic as 
proponents like Lakatos (1999), Luk (2015), or Laudan (1990) may believe, one must first 
distinguish between what is and “is not” science—and further between what practical daily 
science and theoretical science look like.  
 As has been previously discussed, Kuhn's humanistic theory choice suggests that science 
is largely about choosing between theories in such a way that scientists choose not the most 
rational but the most preferred theory (2015). In a broader sense, however, Kuhn implicates 
scientific rationality as a historical pursuit—that is to say, the past history of works and body of 
knowledge naturally impede rational choice such that what one knows and chooses to knows is a 
matter of the historicity of that knowledge. Thus, part of this section will be devoted to 
understanding the role historical works play into current methodology and further how the 





 The first important dichotomy that must be explored is science versus “not science”--or 
more commonly termed, pseudoscience. While the term pseudoscience shall be henceforth used 
to refer to anything outside the realm of currently considered orthodox or “true” science, this 
observer notes that the term pseudoscience has historical precedence that makes this distinction 
in itself contradictory. For the current, this term shall be used without prejudice to its historical 
connotations to refer to anything considered unscientific. 
 In this, then, one must first determine what is scientific. However, even for most 
philosophers, this is elusive. If science is an exploration of one's own natural world, what may 
adequately describe science? A common conception is that science is limited to simply what one 
can see and explore in a worldly sense. However, as demonstrated by Galileo's error in 
determining the cause of tides, many things one cannot see or explicitly experience are 
scientific—in this case the gravitational effect of the moon which at the time was unknown 
(Naylor, 2007). However, such error does demonstrate at least one element of the current 
conception of science, which is that science does refer first to universal models. This is to say 
that the aim of all scientific study is to produce a broad understanding of the order of the 
universe (Naylor, 2007).  
 Once again, however, this definition of science falls short. Many disciplines seek to 
explain the overarching structure of nature and its workings. Thus, even though true, this does 
not distinguish any better between science and pseudoscience. As such, stricter criteria must be 
met. 
 According to Jaffe, there are 3 criterion that make up modern science: (1 logic and logical 
explanation, (2 it is “based solely on the production of rational constructs”, and (3 theories are 
falsifiable (2010). This stands in contrast to earlier theories of science which instead stated that 
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theories must be “verifiable”, which is to say that evidence may be made for such theories. In 
response to critique by Karl Popper, verifiability was largely replaced by falsifiability—the role 
verifiability plays into science despite its definitional exclusion will be explored later (Popper, 
1959). 
 According to Mitchell, science is much stricter. Whereas Jaffe's criteria leave room for 
generalist theories to remain scientific, Mitchell gives a stronger picture. Scientific laws’ 
generality, according to Mitchell, while applicable to science, is distinguished in this way: 
science is not simply a restatement of the general truths regarding the universe but rather an 
explanation of those truths in some degree (Mitchell, 2000). Specifically, Mitchell brings science 
further from humanism towards the practical and pragmatic (Mitchell, 1997). Science describes 
and proscribes the expected range of events resulting from certain phenomena (Mitchell, 2000). 
Mitchell's definition once again includes universality, but tightens science to being about the 
experiential and bringing the universal into what Jaffe's referred to as a rational construct 
(Mitchell, 2000). Whereas Jaffe suggests some constructs beyond human limits of understanding 
(Jaffe, 2010), Mitchell's definition of science suggests that true science requires that the construct 
bring phenomena into a more explicit finite comprehension (Mitchell, 2000).  
 Bunge suggests there are different kinds and criteria for science. Some science, 
nomological law, reflect classed patterns of events without provisional regard. Meanwhile, 
predictive statements are a form of science that suggests a future outcome without regard to 
actual empirical accuracy (1961). This separation of criteria diverges greatly from other 
suggested forms of science. Moreover, its set of criteria are based largely upon the goal. This 
definition of science includes many classes of exploration specifically excluded from either 
Jaffe's or Mitchell's definitions.  
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 In searching to understand a difference between philosophy of science and education 
science in the position on the nature of science, Alters explored many differing sets of opinions 
of the nature of science. Answers varied from object realism to object anti-realism, from 
curiosity and openness to rigid prescription of exploration, from historical to independent, from 
defined by the body of knowledge to defined by external factors. Indeed, it seems that this 
inconsistency suggests no formal basis for science (1997). 
 However, in response to Alters, Eflins et al produced a list of consensus and dissensus 
areas (1999). The specifics are not quite so important, as consensus is used here to determine 
what science is—i.e., no overarching definition but the practices of individuals—and so only a 
general accounting of public belief is given. The importance of this list, instead, refers to a major 
distinction that separates science from other areas: it is based upon the general agreement of 
those within the field (Eflin et al., 1999). Thus, science may be best understood by the body of 
knowledge that has been generally agreed upon as science. This is, in itself, a Kuhnian 
principle—that is to say, herein, science already adheres to Kuhn's social theory of science 
(Kuhn, 2015). However, for a moment, the social element of science will be considered 
separately from the body of knowledge itself. This is to say, for the sake of the scientific 
argument and consideration, the human element will be considered as extricable from the body 
of knowledge and scientific understanding will be considered as external (that is, innate to the 
world itself). Therefore, science can be understood by the agreed distinctions between common 
held understandings of what is and is not. 
The New Criteria for Science: Science vs. Pseudoscience 
Evidently, determining criteria for science is difficult at best, and clearly outside of 
consensus. This is because such a definition requires a somewhat circular reasoning. To 
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determine what is scientific, one must first establish what science is and is not. To determine 
what science is, one must have a firm understanding of what is scientific. However, it is perhaps 
simpler to work from the negative. Instead of defining science in terms of what it is, it may be 
easier to understand from what it is not, as this is held in better agreement. 
 So what is not scientific? Thagard gives a fair summary when he attacks the 
pseudoscience of astrology (1978). Here, he gives three criteria that demarcate pseudoscience 
from science. First is theory. Theory, here, refers to having a structural and predictive model. 
While Thagard is concerned with Popper's falsifiability, he also makes the claim that 
falsifiability itself is not strictly scientific. Instead, he refers to Popper's own claims to show that 
falsifiability (1 can be achieved by continuous modification of the theory, (2 only occurs when a 
theory is positively replaced by another sound theory, and (3 is based upon subjective heuristic. 
As such, theory in science simply means that a suggested knowledge can indeed claim to explain 
a phenomenon (1978). 
 Second, is community. Community refers to consistency of belief of the advocates of the 
theory. This is to say, community is the body of knowledge surrounding the topic pointed 
towards creating and holding a consistent theory. Moreover, the community is aimed at reducing 
anomalies through further explication upon the theory. Thagard suggests that, if the community 
is not consistent in belief with no intention of reducing anomaly, the theory is pseudoscientific. 
This has issues itself. For example, many scientific theories have not held up to this criterion. 
However, this is further explained by Thagard's third criteria: historical context (1978). 
 Building off Kuhn, Thagard creates two definitions of historical context by which science 
and pseudoscience may be considered: whether the theory has “faced anomalies over a long 
period of time” (227) and the extent to which alternate theories have challenged it. This leads to 
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Thagard's theory of progressiveness as it relates to pseudoscience. Progressiveness is the theory's 
historical ability to add to itself to defend against both alternate theories and natural anomalies. 
Thus,   
 
 “A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if:  
1) it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces 
many unsolved problems; but 
2) the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards 
solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in 
relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations. " 
(1978, 228). 
 
 Thagard specifically delineates between nonprogressively scientific and pseudoscientific 
moreover; pseudoscience must be less progressive than alternatives whereas nonprogressive 
theories can be scientific so long as no alternates are more progressive. Therefore, pseudoscience 
can, in this way, be well distinguished from science. 
 Using this definition of pseudoscience, an approach to defining science is made simpler. 
Science is simply when one or both of these criteria is not met. That, however, continues to leave 
a large degree of uncertainty. After all, this allows for strictly untrue theories to be science. Thus, 
Galileo's explanation of the tides, as referenced before, despite being proven wrong remains 
scientific within its historical context but is pseudoscientific now. Similarly, certain concepts 
which are scientific at current may progress in the near future to be pseudoscientific. This 
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unfortunately poses an issue methodologically speaking. How do we test for science? As our 
ability to test or explore improves, science that was once true may become untrue and thereby 
pseudoscientific. From a body of knowledge, this means that science must constantly be retested. 
And, if a seminal work proves to be pseudoscientific, due to the historical precedent of science, a 
whole field could in theory become pseudoscientific. However, is this within scientific 
conception? Once again, this issue shall be explored further in this section. For now, let the 
working definition of science hold as a way to explore current understanding of methodology.  
Orthodox Science 
It can therefore be seen that from an orthodox lens, science is at least naturalistic. 
Thagard’s definition, as well as all presented other attempts to define science, points towards 
general conceptions of science supporting naturalistic reality. This is to say, science is aimed at 
providing facts about a factual world. In short, naturalism here can be replaced with objectivity, 
and thus the question of naturalism versus humanism becomes only about the individual human 
elements within science, and not about the pursuit as a whole. 
This establishes the basis set of ideas for what is orthodox science within the scope of this 
work. From hereforth, it shall be suggested that science is believed to be an objective pursuit of 
naturalistic focus, though there may be some humanistic elements incorporated. It shall also be 
held that Thagard’s definition of pseudoscience works within this framework and context. 
 
Planck and Nietzsche 
 To interrogate this designation of science, and specifically to look at the way in which 
this orthodox definition may be obsoleted without our knowing it, some amount of science must 
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be used. For this then it is important to choose a seminal scientist. From there, the work can be 
explored, and, using a proper philosophical model, the importance of the work can be deduced as 
it relates to orthodox practice and definition.  
Planck 
Maxwell Planck was a German-born physicist of the early 20th century. He did major work in the 
field of research as well as university lectures. He is most well known for the development of 
quanta of energy, and his seminal work “On the Law of Distribution of Energy in the Normal 
Spectrum” forever changed the face of physics. For this work, he won the Nobel Prize in Physics 
in 1919. This publication shifts the paradigm from classical mechanics to quantum physics by 
reanalyzing blackbody radiation to develop an equation that fits. This equation would come to be 
known as Planck’s Law. 
 Planck is also known for his philosophical quandaries in physics. Some of these are not 
well known, while others are more widely read. One of the lesser known topics is phantomness, 
which covers the idea of unexplorable ideas in science. This concept of phantomness includes 
those problems that are largely considered pseudoscientific, as well as certain others considered 
scientific. Phantomness within the quantum scientific narrative may therefore be important to 
unraveling the distinction between science and pseudoscience and being able to finally put to rest 
how objective or nonobjective science truly may be. 
The Problem of Blackbody Radiation 
The problem with which Planck was presented that led to the example provided below, Planck’s 
Radiation Law, is that of blackbody radiation. A blackbody is a term that is used to refer to an 
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object with the capability to perfectly absorb electromagnetic radiation, no matter angle of 
incidence or wavelength. Thus, a blackbody is a perfect absorber for light.  
 The blackbody itself does not present a problem. However, in the years preceding Planck, 
experiments were conducted involving the specific absorption and emission of electromagnetic 
radiation. As used here, emission refers to blackbody radiation. Blackbody radiation occurs when 
a body at a given temperature emets specific wavelengths. This is true regardless of the shape or 
composition. Instead, it was discovered the wavelengths emitted are determined by temperature 
alone.  
The specific relationship between spectral emission and temperature, unknown to many, 
was referred to as Kirchoff’s equation. The determination of it was believed to be of extreme 
importance to understanding light and specifically spectral density. If one could solve Kirchoff’s 
Law, the problem of light would be presumably solved. At this time, light was believed to be a 
wave (though there were still some arguments about whether it was wave or particle). As such, 
classical understandings of waves were largely believed to be the solutions to Kirchoff’s 
equation. 
 There is a problem. In classical mechanics, the energy of a wave is related to the square 
of its amplitude. In other words, when heated, the amplitude, that is, intensity, of the light should 
change, but not the wavelengths. Observation showed instead that heating a blackbody caused a 
displacement in the wavelengths emitted (according with Wien’s Displacement Law discussed 
later).  
 Because classical mechanics was scientific truth, there were certain assumptions that had 
to be taken by almost all models to attempt to solve this problem. First, energy for a wave was 
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known to be continuous, not discrete. This simply means that the scientific belief was that there 
was a continuous energy spectrum on waves representing the different observed spectra, and that 
there were not discrete energy levels (for this would produce stepwise spectra). This was 
consistent with other classical findings. It was also known that discrete energy levels would lead 
to continuous emission of light and decaying of the atom. Otherwise, it was suspected (by 
Boltzmann and Wien) that the Law of Conservation of Energy would have to be provisional and 
thus not a universal truth. Thus, it was believed law of conservation of energy may not be true 
with blackbody radiation. Finally, it was believed that, consistent with classical mechanics, 
energy was emitted continuously and tended towards infinity. 
 As will be demonstrated in detail later, these would all prove to be untrue (or at least, 
fatal to accurate models).  However, this set the stage for Planck. What was the relationship 
between spectral density, wavelength, and temperature; and what sort of equation could be 
created consistent with classical mechanics?  
Nietzsche 
 Friedrich Nietzsche was a German-born modern philosopher who predated Planck by 
some time. His works covered a vast array of philosophical topics. He is most well known for his 
philosophy of health and for his critiques of various rational philosophies. He is perhaps most 
well known for his concepts of genealogy and for his invention of perspectivism. Nietzsche is 
also well known for his concepts of nonobjectivity, or rather the lack of facticity. In all this is a 
sense of the same sorts of problems as those posed by quantum science, and as such, Nietzsche 




PLANCK AND PHANTOM PROBLEMS 
 
The case both for and against the current and seemingly orthodox—discussed in brief above—  
understanding of scientific epistemology shall be made now using a specific and seminal 
example, to understand the role current orthodox assumptions play or fail to play shifting 
scientific paradigms and thought. This critique of science and objectivity may reveal the possible 
validity of some critiques, especially from the Nietzschean school of thought. 
 Though many examples exist, Maxwell Planck’s work with light and electrons shall be 
discussed as it relates to methodological underpinnings of scientific discovery. Due to his major 
role in shifting the paradigm of classical physics directly into the quantum realm along with 
several of his contemporaries, he serves as an important example into the way current 
methodology does or does not fit beliefs about scientific process. His discoveries paved the way 
for truly new and revolutionary ideas, some of which changed not only science but the 
philosophy of science. Therefore, some of Planck’s philosophical views of science, its 
limitations, and its role in discovery is first tangentially necessary before a full accounting of the 
actual experimentation. 
 
Planck’s Phantom Problems 
Types of Phantoms 
 In his recorded lectures, Planck described to his students what he calls a “phantom 
problem of science” (Planck, 1949, p. 54). As the quantum physicist will note, his description of 
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phantom problems fits strongly with Schrodinger’s probabilistic duality and superposition of 
states. This phantom problem informs Planck’s description of scientific inquiry and the 
importance of both scientific method and discovery. 
 So what is this phantom problem? For Planck there are three types of phantomness. The 
first occur when the underlying assumptions are immediately erroneous. This includes any 
problems in which the apparatus to explore such problems requires immaterial or impossible 
method(s). The examples Planck provides are perpetual motion and radioactive transmutation of 
elements, though this includes problems that become unexplorable as a result of changing 
science, such as the issue of ether, which became unexplorable once ether was disproven. But, 
Planck notes that meaning may be returned as new science develops (Planck, 1949, p. 54-57). 
Consequently, this form of phantom problem, in line with the definition of science previously 
discussed, retains historicity as a major component, but allows for a degree of flexibility for 
circular historicity that has not yet been introduced in discussion of orthodox science. This 
piquing, degradation, and repiquing of scientific interest, meaning, and the potential reality of 
phantom problems is strikingly apt for understanding the issue of light, which requires constant 
reevaluation, and burying, and revitalizing old and new theories. This will be returned to in short 
when Planck’s relation to Bohr is discussed. 
 The second type of phantom problem exists when vagueness prevents a precise answer. 
For orthodox science, this will seem intuitive, but will require further dissection when actual 
study is discussed later. This type of problem evolves as the discussion of study evolves in 
relation to practical science. Momentarily, let this be understood as the type of problem that 
arises when asked whether phenomenon A is more normal than phenomenon B, such that the 
requirements of answering the question rely on the conditions in A and B and phenomenon AB 
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(probabilistic duality)  before being able to determine the probability or normality of A or B 
within the system. Though not referred to in this way by Planck, this may be described as the 
phantom problem of the probabilistic system AB which requires predetermination before either 
A or B’s nature can be established within the system, such that either A or B becomes an 
acceptable or unacceptable answer as a result of ambiguity in the system. This admittedly vauge 
definition, can be applied to the situation of the famed Schrodinger’s cat, wherein the cat must be 
both and neither due to lacking determinate knowledge of the system. Superposition is, within 
this frame, a subset of the second type of phantomness (Planck, 1949, p. 54-57). 
 The third type of phantom problem exists when two or more answers are equally valid, or 
two answers in a dichotomous system are equally invalid, depending on the viewpoint and 
methods of testing for the problem. The greatest example, the one which will be discussed in 
greatest detail below, is that of light and of wave/particle duality. In his lectures, Planck 
describes the electron wave-particle duality here and the issue of Newtonian emission theory 
versus Huygen’s wave theory. This is, as Planck says, the sort of problem where the viewpoint 
matters and the results one receives are a consequence of the methods one employed (1949, p. 
57-59).  
Phantom Problems from a Nietzschean Perspective 
 Those familiar with Nietzsche will be quick to note the similarity between these types of 
phantom problems and several of his critiques of science and objectivity. Evidently obvious in 
the first type of phantom problem is Nietzsche’s theory of eternal recurrence, wherein the past is 
doomed to play out again and again in the present. While one would not suggest that exact 
recurrence is implicit in Planck, it is clear that historical precedent must be questioned, 
examined, requestioned, and re-examined throughout time due to the revival of phantom 
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problems in new and sometimes non-phantom lenses. What this means for science will be 
demonstrated as example problems are discussed, with specific note to Nietzschean experience 
and theory (Nietzsche, 1974, The Gay Science, §341).  
These second and third types of phantom problems are also open to a Nietzschean 
critique of practical science, specifically his discussion of facts and interpretation. As Nietzsche 
says, “There are no facts, only interpretations...even that is interpretation” (Nietzsche, 1886-87, 
Nachlass, 7 (§60)). Consistent with these phantom problems, Nietzsche suggests the response of 
a system is necessarily part of the interpretation, not fact of the system. How this applies to 
Schrodingerian probabilistic systems1 and Planck will be clearly evident, however, when one 
considers the necessary interpretation of the answer(s) following method. Answers are in no way 
a definite result preceding interpretation into method.  
In so far as the third type of phantom problem, Nietzsche has the following to say, 
“In so far as the word ‘knowledge’ has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it 
is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.—
'Perspectivism.’ It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and 
Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would 
like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.” 
—The Will to Power, Book III §481 
While this may move beyond Planck’s own understanding of the phantoms problems, it 
nonetheless serves as a more precise definition of those problems.  
                                                          
1 This applies possibly only to the Copenhagen interpretation, which differs from other interpretations by saying 
that the observer causes collapse of the wavefunction to allow objective measurement. This objective 
measurement does not exist within this interpretation before observation. However, other interpretations do exist 
which may not comport with this understanding. 
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 Consider, for the moment, the example provided by Planck of emission versus wave 
theory. The acceptance of either theory is, according to Planck, largely a matter of priority. And, 
more importantly, the facts and observations depend entirely on the point of view with which the 
problem is approached. If a classical model is accepted, surely one method, apparatus, and 
analysis will be preferred, while a quantum physicist will potentially use separate method, 
apparatus, and analysis. This may not seem an issue, but when considering the seeming absolute 
nature of scientific method, this poses a great issue, especially in the face of what seems to be a 
contradictory dichotomy. 
 One may be prone to a classical understanding of Planck’s physics that “in no single 
instance is it possible accurately to predict a physical event” (1936, The Philosophy of Physics, p. 
46). It is the case that there is always some amount of uncertainty in measurement. This is the 
impossibility of causality, which Planck terms  “world image” of symbols which comprises 
physics (51). This too evokes Nietzsche’s images of the world which claims we must always 
interact with symbols, as opposed to discovering true noumena. So says Nietzsche, “There are no 
moral phenomenon at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena” (Nietzsche, 1886, 
Beyond Good and Evil, §108) for “as soon as a philosophy begins to believe in itself [, it] always 
creates a world in its own image” (Nietzsche, 1886, Beyond Good and Evil, §9).  
 The third type of phantom problem for Planck depends upon the multiple interpretations 
of results, in turn depending on the status of objects and their relation to each other., that is 
science, of giving these images meaning. Since the results depend largely on perspective 
according to Planck, the image itself is but a shadow of our own image. Thus, the problem of 
light, and its status as wave versus particle, is philosophically predeterminate according to our 
own interpretations. From the perspective of Nietzsche’s knowledge, this is an issue of 
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interpretation (problem of predictability). When we, as scientists, interact with the images of the 
world—in this case the behavior of light as particle or wave—our results, perspectives, and 
resulting interpretations happily respond in a way that comports with those images, if possible. 
The Meaningfulness of Phantom Problems 
 Planck is quick to point out that the weight of a phantom problem is not in its 
phantomness, but its meaningfulness as a problem (1949, 57-58). The phantom problem may be 
just as meaningful, even more so, than the nonphantom problem. This stipulation then suggests 
that the meaningfulness of a problem as a whole is unrelated to its practicality,  its necessity as a 
problem, or its naturalistic reality. However, the phantom problem, within Planck’s framework, 
has potential outside of these definitions. This is especially so in consideration as scientific, the 
difference between science and nonscience.  
 Take, for example, the electron as wave versus particle as cited by Planck. Within a 
context of late 19th century thought, the practicality of such a problem was virtual at best. The 
naturalistic reality of this problem was and is better understood today to be nigh indeterminate. 
Certainly it was not, at the time, necessary (though the debate on such claims still linger). 
Despite this, the behavior of such a particle is of such incredible meaningfulness to science that 
even the defunct theories of the electron and atomic structure persist in modern textbooks as 
important guides. But, was the electron a phantom particle? Though Planck explicitly names this 
duality part of a phantom problem of the second and third type, to the modern eye the 
phantomness may not appear as clear. If considered within original classical contexts, the 
modern particle answer to light is preposterous. If considered within modern insights, the 
classical wave truths become an entanglement. When considered within the quantum framework, 
the wave-particle duality is even more insane. What Planck’s law comes to show is the strange 
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nature of the electron’s (or photon’s) existence, before and after exact observation (Planck, 
1901). 
 Simply put, an electron or a photon, due to probability fields, must be considered as 
existing in wave form before observation as a particle, in order to adequately fit with spectral 
density and radioactive emission (Planck, 1967). This means that the simple act of determining 
in itself changes the electron’s physical nature. Or, put another way, the electron’s physical 
nature is indeterminate until observed. This is a quite real Copenhagen interpretation paradox.  
 This demonstrates clearly the second type of problem. Determining the nature of an 
electron as a particle or a wave first requires determining the answer within context of the 
system. AB is indeterminate from either A or B without proper constraint. The particle behavior 
of the electron can only be examined within contexts of a particle framework or apparatus. And 
yet, it is known that the wave nature of the electron must be respected to be able to examine 
those particle behaviors. Apart from this, methodology will not answer the question—or rather, 
the data gathered will be unable to satisfactorily explain the behavior because the apparatus must 
be designed to account for the additive behaviors of the dual-nature.  
 It similarly demonstrates the third type of phantom problem. To even adequately measure 
this problem or develop a method to analyze it, a particular paradigm must first be adopted. 
Measuring any part of the dual nature requires inherently that a nature be adopted as the baseline. 
This extends from formerly discussed Popperian postpositivist thought; if science is going to 
disprove, there must be a null thesis against which this disproof is measured. Thus, one thesis or 
in this case one paradigm), must be established as the measurer of accuracy. In itself, this implies 
establishing the rules by which the target, the electron, is expected or required to behave within 
context of the baseline assumption. Thus the answer is presupposed. 
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 In his Gay Science, Nietzsche comments, “We hear only those questions for which we are 
in a position to find answers” (Nietzsche, 1974). Plank, it seems, would agree strongly. Phantom 
problems of the type just discussed require having an answer or insight, at the very least to the 
systematic approach, and thus a determinate answer is impossible or, at least, multiple, valid, 
determinate answers may exist, depending on approach and how the question is heard.  
  In orthodox science, unscientific questions may be meaningful but not valuable as 
a scientific question. For example, the question of God is meaningful to a scientist, however, of 
no theoretical scientific value, within orthodox conceptions of science. Using this same 
distinction between principally meaningful (as God) and scientifically meaningful (as an 
observable natural phenomena), the question of the meaningfulness of phantom problems can be 
properly explored. Though these underlying assumptions about scientific lines of question may 
be grossly inaccurate and require reworking, this framework will be used to evaluate Planck’s 
phantom problems within an orthodox bent. 
 For instance, the electron wave-particle duality, a phantom problem as demonstrated 
above, meets requirements for scientific questioning. The nature of the electron is testable. The 
nature of the electron is falsifiable, as a dichotomous matter. It is verifiable, repeatable, and 
observable. From a simple orthodox lens, there is scientific meaning behind this phantom 
problem, which allows for the consideration of other phantom problems on a case-by-case basis.  
 But, is there practical meaningfulness behind these types of problems? As demonstrated 
by Planck’s example of the determination of the true “right wall”2, some phantom problems, 
                                                          
2 The problem Planck gives in his lecture. This talks about the problem of determining whether a given wall of the 
lecture hall is the true right or left wall of the room. When first introduced, it is talked about as a meaningless 
problem, for what does it matter, even if an absolute, objective “right wall” can be determined without 
perspective problems impinging. However, Planck continues then to allude to the issue of right-handed and left-
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while scientifically sound, are not practically meaningful. Whether a wall is right or left when 
physical context can change is not meaningful. However, this same problem applied to 
chemistry, where the right and left matter greatly, is of highest meaning (Planck, 1949, 58). 
Within this context, one may say generally that phantom problems can be meaningful. 
 They may be meaningful in one context and lose meaning in another. They may have 
meaning only within the context of the framework from which they are examined. Returning 
once more to the example of the ether, tests regarding the drag of the earth through the ether 
were meaningful, though phantom, when the ether was the popular paradigm, but such tests are 
no longer meaningful now that the ether is considered defunct as a theory. If recast into terms 
compatible with the vacuum paradigm, such a test may then once again (and is currently in Pilot 
wave theory) regain meaning while maintaining its phantom nature.  
 In light of this, one may believe that phantom problems are not meaningful. However, it 
is exactly these types of problems that result in greatest scientific change. Phantom problems are 
incredibly meaningful. If they are scientific and meaningful, however, how is it that they do not 
fit with scientific methodology?  
Planck’s Law and Phantomness 
Planck’s Radiation Law 
 Coming then to experimental anecdote to exemplify the methodology that is being 
employed by Planck, one must examine his law of thermal radiation. Planck’s Law was a 
response to early attempts to solve the issue of blackbody radiation. A brief history is given here. 
                                                          
handed molecules, wherein the state of “true right” or “true left”, which has not changed in abstraction from the 
classroom example, becomes of apical rather that the formerly semantic importance to the chemist as right-
handed and left-handed molecules exhibit different properties and different biological ability. 
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Blackbody radiation had been 
historically understood by physics as 
early as the 1800s. It was known that the 
blackbody was a perfect absorber and 
emitter of light. In the 19th century 
Kirchoff discovered that spectral density 
of black bodies depended only on the 
frequency of the radiation and the 
temperature of the blackbody (Figure 1). This showed that spectral density was a natural 
characteristic of a given blackbody and natural to that radiation (Baggot, 4-24).  
 The shifts in wavelengths based upon temperature however was unpredicted. This 
launched a generation of classical physicists to explore this problem (Baggot, 4-24). There were 
several developed theories, but for simplicity, two are presented here to illustrate the issues 
brought about by the classical approach. One of the competing theories was Wien’s Law, which 
was developed from experimental data. Wien, using the data of blackbodies, determined an 
equation as shown below: 
 𝑝(𝑣, 𝑇) =  𝑒  (Baggot 294) 
This equation accurately predicts spectral density at shorter wavelengths, but fails at longer 
wavelengths, from which a clear divergence can be seen. 
 Meanwhile, another leading theory, the Rayleigh-Jeans Law (represented below), 
similarly approximated spectral density. 
Figure 1 Displayed above is a public domain image representing the relationship 
between temperature of a body, spectral radiance, and wavelengths emitted. As 
show, emission moves towards violet as temperature is increased. 
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 𝑝(𝑣, 𝑇) =   (Baggot, 294) 
 It used logical deductions from classical physics to 
suggest that energy is continuously emitted and that 
energy emitted tended to infinity with increasing 
frequency. In brief, the failings of this particular theory 
can be summarized simply by showing the divergence 
of spectral density within shorter wavelengths. Due to 
the tendency towards infinity, this approximation 
resulted in what came to be called the ‘ultraviolet 
catastrophe”; while the approximation for longer 
wavelengths was fairly accurate, the approximation in 
shorter wavelengths (seen especially in the ultraviolet 
range from which the maximum peak emission was expected under a classical model) was 
catastrophically inaccurate (Baggot, 4-24). See Figure 4 for comparisons of the varying models.  
 Obvious in retrospect is that both models ultimately failed due to inaccurate classical 
assumptions at the quantum level. Namely, the continuum of energy held by classical mechanics 
for waves would be found as wanting. Secondarily, the assumptions of electron activity, not yet 
formally discovered, proved another source of error. 
 But, Planck made a major discovery. Shown below is that discovery, now known as 
Planck’s law: 
 p(𝑣, 𝑇) =   (Planck, 1901) 
Figure 2 Above, the predicted spectral density for a 1000 
K blackbody is given for each model of Wien's, Plancks, 
and Rayleigh-Jean's. Figure courtesy of Wikimedia. 
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Here, v represents the frequency of the wave (which is inversely proportional to wavelength), T 
represents temperature of the blackbody, h is Planck’s constant, and k is Boltzmann’s constant. 
This formula was a theoretical derivation made from the experimental data. Yet, at the time 
developed, Planck’s derivation did not extend from theoretical foundational principles and 
instead introduced new assumptions into physics inconsistent with classical assumptions. 
Namely, Planck had to assume that energy was only absorbed and released in discrete quantities 
of integer multiples of hv (Planck, 1967). This directly contradicts the continuous nature of wave 
behavior established in earlier classical mechanics (Baggot, 13). Moreover, it describes a certain 
molecular behavior (or particulate behavior) for which there was no explanation and no proof, 
theoretical or otherwise. Yet, this formula matched accurately to experimental observations. 
 This stroke of luck would kickstart quantum mechanics, revolutionizing physics. The 
term now applied to Planck’s discrete energy levels, quantization, has become a staple of physics 
and chemistry. But was the reasoning scientifically valid? Moreover, what is the epistemological 
significance? While Planck later came back and proved theoretically this equation using 
Boltzmann’s statistical method for probability densities in locating a gas particle (what would 
come to be known as photons for Planck), the beginning of this established physical law 
contrasted orthodox science in many ways. 
 Additionally, this stands in direct contrast to the way popularized epistemological 
definitions suggest the scientific process of knowledge works. For instance, the development of 
quanta, obvious here to be important to discovery of the law, is not at all in keeping for 
previously discussed epistemological considerations. However, without adding this basic 
assumption, it is clear that attempts to discover Kirchoff’s function would have failed.  
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 Moreover, Planck used as a basis for derivation the defunct Wien’s Law, known to have 
failed in its approximations though it worked under certain circumstances (Planck, 1967). 
Important to its discovery was his ability to derive Wien’s Law from his own developed formula. 
This was important because Wien’s Law was intricately tied to Wien’s Displacement Law, a law 
of radiation that was deemed necessary to explain light’s behavior. Indeed, as the frequency 
approaches infinity, Planck’s Law and Wien’s law can be seen to converge due to reduction of 
the exponential term. This has major implications itself. Planck used and confirmed his theory, 
which had “weak theoretical foundations” (Baggot, 13), with an incorrect though close 
approximation. This tweaking of numbers from incorrect to seemingly correct, without the 
normal method has a major impact on its validity, despite that it did something necessary to be 
an acceptable descriptive law. 
 Beyond matching the experimental curves, his law also correctly reached the maximum 
wavelength of emission as a function of temperature as predicted by Wien’s Displacement Law. 




  (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑘, 1959, 102) 
  
describes the inverse relationship between maximum wavelength of emission and temperature of 
the radiating body. b here represents a proportionality coefficient equivalent to hc/(xkT), where x 
is a coefficient solvable through Planck’s law. The importance of this is that, Planck’s law, 
which can be reduced to predict Wien’s Displacement Law, further correctly predicted maximum 
wavelengths of blackbody radiation without depending on the Displacement Law to derive. 
Indeed, the Displacement Law may be derived from Planck’s Law  (Baggot 4-24).  
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 Unintuitively, this is important itself for two major reasons. First, as mentioned before, 
the classical assumption for waves is that energy is related to the square of the amplitude. 
However, the displacement law states that frequency distribution is directly related to 
temperature. Thus, the underlying basis for establishing Planck’s Law was a necessarily quantum 
assumption of the nature of wave behavior (that energy is discretely related to a proportionality 
to frequency); this conversely means that the predicate for its acceptance as a theory was an 
inherently quantum assumption. Second, the derivation of the former law, as with Wien’s 
approximation, from the developed law is important to consideration as a phantom problem 
within the nature of scientific historicity. 
Planck’s Law in Consideration as a Phantom Problem 
 As mentioned above, the conundrums of Planck’s Law are mostly theoretical, rather than 
necessary factual. The philosophical implications of the law itself are discussed elsewhere, 
however, the methodological truths and mistruths have been mostly overlooked. To properly 
understand the critique of science, a meta-analysis of Planck’s method in terms of his own 
philosophical approach is necessary. Such an analysis of his law as a phantom problem shows 
clearly the relationship of phantomness to science and method. Second, the analysis of his 
solution within the different phantom frameworks will resolve discrepancies within orthodox and 
classical approaches in solving phantomness of types 2 and 3. And third, such an analysis 
showsthe true inconsistencies within scientific epistemology to a more thorough critique not 
constrained by naturalistic dichotomy, while avoiding the errors of both positivist and negativist 
attitudes towards reality.  
 So first, it must be established, if Planck’s law is or was a phantom problem, what types 
or types of phantomness it contains. As mentioned above, there are a number of major concerns 
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with Planck’s Law and its development. The first issue, then, is the required assumption of the 
law. In order for the law to work, it required that Planck first assumed that energy could only be 
released and absorbed in discrete quantities, known as quanta. However, at the time Planck 
discovered the law, such a derivation had not been developed. In fact, it was only after the theory 
gained acceptance that Planck actually went to produce a sound derivation of this phenomena. 
But is this phantom? 
 According to Planck’s definition, this exemplifies all types of phantomness. In the first 
case, the basic assumptions, from contemporary scientific understandings were erroneous. They 
were not factually erroneous, but simply contextually erroneous. It was a widespread 
understanding that energy in a wave was continuous, according to certain classical contexts. At 
the time, though, the use of quanta to explain emissive behavior was problematic, yet, this does 
not mean it was wrong. As Planck points out, phantomness can change, i.e, as ideas about energy 
quanta were developed, this became no longer phantom. 
 This also conforms to the second type of phantomness. On the surface, it is easy to see its 
phantomness: quantized energy (quanta) states assume a certain quality of quantum 
understanding of thermal energy and wavelength (A) about the dual-imposed system (AB) before 
either quantum (A) or classical conceptions of thermal energy and wavelength (B) is fairly 
established and by nature prevent superposition of the states by reducing the B qualities of the 
system. Within context of Planck, the assumption of quantized energy states naturally oppose the 
underlying assumption of continuous energy states thereby allowing only exploration and 
explanation related to quantized energy states. As such, the system AB is minimized providing 
images of system A as if system AB were generally reduceable to A. However, this reduction 
does not negate the basic vagueness of the question. That is, at the discovery of the law, system 
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AB was necessarily phantom; thus, there were two possible answers depending on the context 
and constraints of the system. The system AB, spectral density as a function of thermal energy 
and wavelength, was then explored given the constraint of quantized energy, as if the constraint 
were generally applicable to both systems A and B separately.  
 The definition of the second type of phantomness given above gave the more general 
form of superposition—that is, when A and B are directly superimposable and the system AB is 
a superposition of those states as a result of dualism. However, modernist logic would suggest 
that the superimposition of AB in this way is exclusively true only when A and B are 
dichotomous. When A and B are not mutually exclusive, that is, when there is overlap (A∩B), 
and when A and B are not given as absolute (when there is a situation C with some chance or a 
situation A’∩B’ with some chance), this superimposition changes. System AB is also dependent 
upon the logical premises of A’∩B’, A∩B, A∪B and A’∪B’. Other conditional operators may 
also exist, but for simplicity this list has been shortened. This changes the superposition. These 
types of vagueness are typical of the second type of phantom problem. 
 Now, the argument may be made that such a duality already contains such a logical 
distinction. Afterall, Schrodinger’s superposition of states, where both and neither are the logical 
consequences of the superposition. However, the distinction made here goes one step further: it 
is that both and neither are already subset possibilities of the superposition. In this case, then, one 
can say that it is simultaneously both both and neither, and neither both and neither. 
 So, with regards to Planck’s Law, it contains the simpler understanding of the second 
type of phantomness and the more complex examples of phantomness. In this case, the system 
was explored with regards to quantized energy. But, the basic assumption of quantized energy 
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brought into possibility the subsets of the system that both and neither set of understandings 
would work.  
 This brings up the second issue. Planck confirmed his equation by showing his law 
reduced to a Wien’s Law. Put another way, a quantum mechanical law could be reduced to a 
classical law. This directly addresses the system stated above. In this case, the quantum 
mechanical assumption was true according to classical mechanical laws. Or simply put, two 
opposed schools of thought remained both true within the law’s context, while at the same time 
one became false by the assumptions already provided. The importance of this dichotomy is, for 
now, not related to the truth of the assumptions or even the truth behind the broader theories. For 
now, it is sufficient acknowledging that the problem of the assumptions about quanta developed 
before the derivation of the formula created a second type of phantomness.  
 Thus finally, the third type of phantomness can also be seen. In this, it becomes clear 
both through the earlier point and through the final issue. In the former case, the interdependence 
of truth mentioned reveals a definite issue: classical and quantum thought are both, to some 
degree, acceptable representations of the systems in question. Already traced out, the classical 
system has failures which show it fails in many ways. However, the relative truth of the 
experiment depends largely on the approach one takes. Take the case of interference patterns. 
Classical models suggested light would be a wave, not a particle, due to the interference patterns 
observed consistently. Planck’s Law does not negate the wavelike behavior, but reinstates a 
particle model too using certain other truths. In this example, the context of a problem, and 
specifically the approach one takes, determines largely what the answers will be.  
 In the more specific case, this is visible in the required quantum assumption to allow 
Planck’s law to be true. To get the answer (the law), classical mechanics must first be rejected in 
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some degree, in this case quantization of energy. Depending on the assumptions taken, answers 
differ. The theory of quantum mechanics, put simply, evolved out of quantum mechanics. To 
develop Planck’s law, Planck first had to develop the assumptions that Planck’s law would 
ultimately invent. Or, Planck’s law could not develop out of classical mechanics. This is a direct 
example of the third type of phantomness. 
So far then, it has been shown that Planck’s law was indeed a phantom problem. It fits 
every type. And, this then goes to suggest that some phantom problems are indeed scientific, to a 
point. In fact, some scientific problems are thoroughly phantom problems. Furthermore, from 
each consideration, it can be shown no single type of phantomness can necessarily be pointed at 
as more scientific than the others. Therefore, it is now important to start considering the actual 
implications of phantomness. 
 
 
Phantomness Opposed to Method 
 As stated before, phantomness does not necessarily contradict normal scientific progress. 
Some phantom questions are quite scientific. Some phantom questions are meaningful. Yet, 
phantom problems do not fit with current methodology. So what distinguishes exploration of 
phantom problems from other scientific inquiry? 
  Taking again Planck as the example, the prior explanations will be used to reveal the 
differences from normal modes of inquiry. Examine the first type of phantomness. Planck’s law 
used as its basis multiple erroneous assumptions, at least within context of the contemporary 
orthodox view. Unlike normal inquiry, which earlier was described to build upon earlier theories 
and specifically to use and test earlier theories, Planck’s law ultimately established its own route. 
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It did not build off established classical truths. Indeed, the equation that built from that base was 
the worst approximation of those discussed. It took a totally separate route with only retroactive 
theoretical basis. The problem then is not that it did this, but that it succeeded, and is the case 
with such types of phantom problems.  
 When this type of phantom problem succeeds in its inquiry, it contradicts the normal 
method by failing to cooperate with the greater body of historical science. Namely, the concept, 
presented briefly in introduction, is that a phenomenon is explored and questioned. If a theory 
explains it, it is accepted. If not, it is rejected. Then, unless challenged by a competing theory, it 
is accepted into the body of work and used as a premise for further exploration. This is the “body 
of scientific knowledge”. But, when an assumption is erroneous in contemporary frameworks, 
there is no building from this base, for the erroneous assumption has already been rejected by the 
base for either failing to work or not fitting with other established science. This is not valid by 
orthodox methodology. 
 As to the second type of phantomness, it suggests that there is a duality of the naturalistic 
system. Or, put more simply, this type of phantomness rejects dichotomy. It accepts a 
superposition of states. This does not seem an issue, but once again consider the specific case. 
For Planck, that phantomness is equated with two different aspects. In the first, the case of a 
classical wave was explored within constraints of quantized energy states. That is, the 
superposition of quanta and continuous energy (understood as spectral density), was examined 
without constraint. Planck then deduced a law by assuming that energy was quantized, and 
applying that generally to the whole system. That is, a dual system was explored by reducing it 
to a separation of its superimposed states, though both states were explored with the assumptions 
of just one state. 
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 In the second case, both quantum mechanical and classical equations were used to 
demonstrate and affirm the law. In this, a quantum/classical superposition was established by the 
law itself. The solution, despite working, had to maintain what would otherwise be contradictory 
systems. 
 In both cases, this inquiry is not fitting with traditional epistemology. On the surface it 
may appear to equate to the normal process of the hierarchy of ideas. But it does differ. In the 
standard hierarchy of thought, one idea succeeds over the other through strength of value or 
truth. This hierarchy would suggest that one principle is more true than another. Instead, in 
Planck’s explanation, one truth gains value from another truth which loses value—simply put, 
this differs in that there is no hierarchy but an interdependence of value.  
 Combined with earlier points, if truth is interdependent there again comes trouble with 
the body of knowledge. How can one truth be undermined if it establishes another truth and vice 
versa? How can an untruth establish a truth? Scientific methodology is currently believed to 
build off success and create greater success. Instead, Planck’s methodology requires establishing 
superpositions that necessarily make the concept of hierarchy defunct, thereby forcing 
questioning of the path of knowledge. 
 This leads once again to the third type of phantomness. For a moment not considering 
superposition, Planck’s example of phantomness is the need for quantum mechanical 
assumptions to properly understand the question in a quantum mechanical method. Or rather, the 
necessity approach plays in interpretation. As an issue of apparatus and perspective, one may say 
that to answer the question in this way it was necessary to first assume a quantum mechanical 
approach. This does not mean there was not a classical answer. Rather, to get the answer Planck 
received, it was necessary to first take a certain perspective. Another perspective, such as 
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Rayleigh’s or as Wien’s, would and did produce different results. Some were more drastically 
variant. The note here is that the quantized assumption was not an established fact—while it 
easily could have been it wasn’t. This means then that the quanta were a matter of perspective 
(clearly show in the acceptance of Boltzmann’s statistics by Planck to later affirm his approach).  
 Once again, though it worked, it is not in line with orthodox epistemology. Firstly, there 
is accepted proof and disproof, as stated earlier. Proof, disproof, and results are all assumed to be 
objective and absolute. But if proof/disproof and results are all part of perspective, then none of 
these can be objective. This then means that acceptance and truth of a theory is only ever 
provisional (a term that will be reintroduced in following sections). If true, then science can no 
longer reduce theories to right and wrong, and the whole postpositivist theory falls apart. 
Moreover, if true, then universality, another constant of science, similarly falls apart, as a theory 
may only be universal given known constraints and perspectives. This would not actually be 
universal or even generally universal; this would be constrained (in line with the second type of 
phantomness). 
 Secondly, the result of perspectivism is that scientific linearity is questioned. Once again, 
there is a consensus that science must build from one sound theory and develop into another. 
This expansion of knowledge, which is truly a reductionist pursuit, requires then that scientific 
theory and results be linear, which is to say that one idea naturally progresses into the next. 
While Kuhn anticipated the trouble with this idea of linearity, even his understanding does not 
escape this concept of linearity (Kuhn, 2015). Simply, even for Kuhn, one paradigm progresses 
into the next, though not necessarily naturally or logically. Either way, it is a stepwise 
progression. But from the perspectivist lens, this is not a requirement and moreover a limitation. 
Since two competing theories ultimately just provide different results, progression down one 
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path simply because it is more likeable produces error. This is evident once again with the 
correctness of Planck versus the incorrectness of his competitors. Therefore, knowledge cannot 
take a linear stepwise progress. It might be necessary, to proceed down an adjacent, parallel path, 
as Planck did. And before giving in to suggesting quantum was simply the next step, remember 
Planck stepped back to classical mechanics rather than forward to denying it. While perhaps 
convergent paths, they were parallel and not linear. Moreover, the implication is that perhaps 
knowledge must regress before going forward—i.e., Rayleigh’s foundation on classical 
mechanics was a failure due to linearity, while Planck’s law succeeded by ignoring those same 
discovered principles.  
 This rejection of linearity is once more against standard epistemology in science. And, 
moreover, the suggestion is that these cases of phantom problems, which by and large exist 
outside the standard, should be included in a more thorough understanding of science. The 
question then is how? What methodology can accomplish being scientific and including inquiry 
that involves these sorts of phantom problems? Importantly, what currently is scientific 





Nietzsche’s Phantom Problem 
 In an aphorism written into one of his notebooks, Nietzsche writes about the conception 
of the real world as reality. In this, he discusses the way from which exterior reality progresses 
from being a phantom problem to being real in the minds of the reader. This is translated below: 
 “For a single human being, the reality of the world would be without probability. But she 
probably will for two people. For the other person is an imagination of us, our very 
"will," our very "idea": and we are the same again in him. But because we know that he 
has to deceive us and that we are a reality despite the phantom he carries in our heads, we 
conclude that he, too, is a reality in spite of our imagination about him: in short, that there 
are realities outside of us.”  
– Nietzsche, Nachlass, Spring, 2 §10 (1880) 
 This Nietzschean phantomness mirrors the phantomness we have already seen in Planck. 
But it also has an additional implication inasmuch as it deals more directly with the concept of 
shadows and images, which is of great significance when talking about the failures of 
empiricism. Moreover, this directly tackles an issue of grounded naturalistic empiricism that in 
some ways comports with Planck, but in others stands almost in direct contradiction with 
Planck’s concept of physics. 
 Nietzsche’s phantomness relies on the difference between idea, will, and reality. 
Remember, Nietzsche does not actually accept that there is a grounded objective reality, 
regardless of whether there is an absolute reality. This means then that Nietzsche’s claim here is 
partly a refutation of Cartesian thought. Indeed, it refers back to Descartes’ automata, from 
which he derives cogito ergo sum, about which Nietzsche here comes to a different conclusion. 
 For Nietzsche, our minds may create the realities of which we can be sure. While for 
Nietzsche these are interpretations, for the individual onlooker they are definite and without 
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alternate perspective, without separate interpretation, and containing no other nonobjective to 
interpose. The world simply is. But once a second person is introduced, the other person 
becomes a dualistic system of reality and unreality. To each person, they are themselves real. 
Based on the Cartesian line, we believe that any person we perceive, like us, must be real. This 
leads quickly into naturalistic empiricism with objective realities that are the byproducts of our 
observations. But this same line of logic allows Nietzsche to make the point that it is our 
observations that create the world. Our will, our idea of the other person, makes them a reality to 
us and us to them. So what is the Nietzsche phantom? 
 The phantom, in this specific aphorism, references to the pressure of the idea and its 
nonbjectiveness that guides the individual thought into the belief other humans are extrinsically 
and externally real. It is the acknowledgement of (1 the necessary deception the other plays on 
our thoughts as a result of our interpreting him and (2 the reciprocal nature of the deception. In 
this, it is our belief in our reality that causes us to come to acceptance of extrinsic reality. 
 This seems so different from Planckian thought. Yet, it is almost exactly the same, just 
applied within different philosophical contexts. Planckian thought focused on the way a problem 
is a phantom; that is, the way in which a true problem may not be a naturalistically real problem. 
Planck suggests that there are phantom problems, which is to say problems without a true or 
objective method for discovering an objective truth or problems without a true or objective truth 
to objectively discover. The slight nuance here is simply a distinction between undiscoverable 
versus perspectival reality.  
 This is the same problem Nietzsche tackles here in his discussion of the phantom. In this 
case, the phantom is the problem of the external world’s deception (objective natural reality) on 
our ability to discern (observation). While Planck describes the process and the problem itself, 
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Nietzsche explores here the consequence of this problem. The consequence is of course 
empirical naturalism. If the objective is undiscoverable or if there is only objectivity in one’s 
own head, as a subjective object, then the only thing humanity can do to preserve facticity is 
change the rules: chiefly, he must accept the other’s nonobjectivity as objective, and from there 
claim mutual reality with discoverable truth but nonobjective discoverers. Man must become his 
own skeptic, rather than become a skeptic of the world. 
 This is not, however, Nietzsche claiming this is the final, or even right, answer. Actually, 
this is a lament. Nietzsche is here illuminating the exact issue of the world: we continue to 
believe in its absolute objective reality despite our (pre-)determined knowledge of the deception 
the world plays. In fact, we contribute to—perhaps even fully create—our own deception about 
the world’s objectivity. This comports with Planck’s phantomness, too. 
 Both Nietzsche and Planck, in discussion of phantomness, present a dilemma and 
argument against the current orthodox view of science that all scientific problems have an 
objective and determined answer based on infallible methodology. The roundaboutness of this is 
what raises the concern. If some scientific problems do not have traditionally scientific methods 
to solve (that is, if some science is not purely based on naturalism and empiricism), what 
alternatives are presented that still live up to the title of science? 
 The answer itself lies in both Nietzsche’s and Planck’s critiques of scientific 
understanding. As such, the examination of this critique must be the starting point of any 
alternative. This section will therefore be devoted to developing a complete picture of that 




The Death of God and the Birth of Quantum 
 
 In one of the most quoted of his passages, Nietzsche discusses the death of God where 
he predicts the rise of nihilism after religion cedes its authority to rationality. This is the birth of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy and movement towards a freer spirit and happier philosophy. Provided 
below, this passage can be seen can be read in terms of the progress of science and the way in 
which quantum mechanics must be scientifically considered. 
 
 “"Where has God gone?" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him - you and I. We 
are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? 
Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we 
unchained the earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving 
now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward, sideward, forward, 
in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite 
nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is it not 
more and more night coming on all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do 
we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we 
not smell anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God 
remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, murderers of all murderers, 
console ourselves? That which was the holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet 
possessed has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? With 
what water could we purify ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games 
shall we need to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not 
ourselves become gods simply to be worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; 
and whosoever shall be born after us - for the sake of this deed he shall be part of a higher 
history than all history hitherto."” 
— The Gay Science §125 (1882) 
 
 Since Nietzsche’s accounting does not, on the surface, appear related to science, it must 
be. What is truly meant by the death of God, and what does this death marks?  
 In the first case, we see the “enlightened” man crying “Where has God gone?”. Then he 
claims that God is dead and in the process of dying. From the futility of rational activity to 
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discover God, nihilism takes hold. What can be holy or mighty in a relativistic sense? What 
importance does it have? Rational philosophy anthropomorphizes God. Hence God dies beneath 
the knife of nihilism. While God is dead, the full significance of this death is still on its way. God 
may be mostly a genealogical hanger-on3. Nietzsche does not claim the superiority of nihilism, 
but simply its historical occurrence and consequences. This has a broader meaning when 
considering the role that the value of ideas, as opposed to the facticity of them, plays in the 
historical development. This historicity, inherent to Nietzsche’s perspectivism, suggests then that 
the death of God is simply a continuation of the life of God, just with a different valuation given 
in the accepted perspective or paradigm. 
 So, even the death of God is possibly just another value that plays a role in the advent and 
history of nihilism. This is important since an  analogy can be drawn with classical mechanics 
and the disruption caused by quantum mechanics. Secondly, Nietzsche suggests that the only 
way we can make sense of life in a world without moral grounding is to acknowledge it as 
seemingly meaninglessness and absurd. This is to say, the response to the lack of the objective 
must be to adapt a perspective that openly accepts the absence of objectivity. A fine point here, 
as discussed earlier in conjunction with error theory, is that Nietzsche does not propose 
oppressive and negativist nihilism.  
 This is different from surrendering to a despairing nihilistic paradigm. Instead, Nietzsche 
views it as freeing. He regrets the death of God, namely in the beauty, nobility, and most of all 
certainty that has been lost, as evidenced by the requiems which he says mark God’s death. But, 
                                                          
3 This concept of genealogy is provided in full by Nietzsche in his work On the Genealogy of Morality. Referenced 
here is the idea that every text is a translation. Specifically, morality as a text is a translation from earlier moralities 
and values. Thus, an idea may work its way quite far from the original, but still remains impacted by the original 
values. This means there is a change over time of the idea, but it retains some form, just transliterated. 
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he also acknowledges that this is the necessary path. Just as with error theory, Nietzsche is not 
making a claim against absolutistism, but is affirming the non-objectivity of things and the way 
reason has killed objectivity. 
 In short, nihilism, has been affirmed by both reason’s success and failure. This can be 
applied then to quantum mechanics and classical mechanics. Quantum mechanics is to classical 
mechanics as nihilism is to God and reason. The very mechanisms on which classical mechanic’s 
success is built are its downfall. Hence, quantum mechanics is the nihilism of science. 
 
How the True World Finally Became a Fable and Planck’s Symbol World 
The True World 
With this in mind, what does it mean for quantum mechanics to be the nihilism of 
science? This requires an understanding of Nietzsche’s will to truth and Planck’s discussion of 
the world of symbols. This starts, however, first with the progress of philosophy (and 
understanding nihilism’s development. Quantum’s role, and its paradigmatic nature, can be 
shown, through this progress, in the same way nihilistic philosophy is revealed. To show this, 
Nietzsche revealed his understanding of philosophical progress in an aphorism titled “The 
History of an Error”. This is reproduced below, with discussion following. 
 “1. The true world — attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it. 
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the 
sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.") 
 2. The true world — unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous 
man ("for the sinner who repents").  
(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible — it becomes 
female, it becomes Christian.)  
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3. The true world — unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it — a 
consolation, an obligation, an imperative. 
(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, 
pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.)  
4. The true world — unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. 
Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate 
us?  
(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)  
5. The "true" world — an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating — an 
idea which has become useless and superfluous — consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish 
it!  
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; 
pandemonium of all free spirits.)  
6. The true world — we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? 
But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.  
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; 
INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)” 
— Twilight of the Idols, “How the ‘True World’ at Last Became a Myth” 
 This aphorism is a philosophical indictment stretching across centuries. In the beginning, then, 
there is a true world, real, discoverable, absolute, objective. There too is a world of image, of shadow, in 
Plato’s cave. The goal of man is to discover the true form of the worlds, its edoi. In scientific 
terminology, this is the beginning of discovery, of science. The true world can be experienced, but it 
must be differentiated from a false one. Indeed, the true world itself is almost inconsequential. Next, 
the world becomes sinful, something that leads one astray from the good. The true world exists only in 
the images one sees. To fully understand the world, one must become separate from the tempting 
symbols of true world. For science, this is the beginning of skepticism. There is truth underlying the 
world only found by rejecting the world. The world can betray the observer. The world can be tested 
and its lies can be revealed through rationalization. The rational man can dismiss falsehoods and 
discover the singular Truth. One escapes this deception by realizing how the world and one’s own 
experiences of it lead to inaccuracies. Once again, the skeptic, the scientist, is created. 
45 
 
 From here, Nietzsche moves to the birth of modern science—Kantian antirealistism. One cannot 
simply be skeptical of the world; the true world is unattainable, nonobservable. It is so suspect that we 
must question its very reality. There is a true a real true world; it simply is beyond our grasp. Only the 
phenomena, not the noumena, can be understood. At this stage, one can observe and predict events. 
One can establish laws and wait for them to be true. Not long after this era, positivism takes a 
stranglehold on reality. The laws and truths of the world cannot be observed, only their effects, both 
direct and indirect. One may believe these Truths, but actual observation of them is impossible. Proof is 
god over reality; the more proof (or evidence), the more valid a theory.  
 If the true world produces images, those images are a product of the Truths of the true world. 
Therefore, the causal nature means the evidence left behind is a (fallacious) logical demonstration of the 
nature of the world’s noumena. A then B; B therefore A becomes the scientific rule. Since one must be a 
skeptic of the world, as images, this is the only way to determine truth, for truth is based on observing 
the effects of the non-observable, the true world, the noumena, on the observable, false phenomena. 
 Alas, positivism too cannot last. It is fallacious, obsolete, inefficient. It produces indefinite 
answers. Postpositivism then, for negativism is too nihilistic. The world can be disproven. Thus, there is 
no true world, only conditionally apparent worlds that are conditionally “true”. One can observe in 
symbols, and this is true enough until disproven. The Popper reigns in his believed superiority—he 
thinks he has triumphed over relativism and answered the problems of perspective. Instead of proving 
true, for that involves perspective, one can prove false or disprove. The lies can be shown, but the truths 
cannot. Refutation (falsifiability) overcomes.  
 With the announcement of nihilism, this too must end. What is disproof but situational and 
perspectival proof? Disproof, too, relies on symbols, images, and perspectives. Both the true world and 
the “true world” is abolished. Not even “true” exists, for its situational nature is dependent on not truth 
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but falsehood. However, even the world of images become meaningless. If there is no true world to 
produce the images, to produce the phenomena, then the apparent world is also an image. There can be 
no apparent world without a true world to produce it. The symbols have no meaning, seemingly, except 
in themselves and in their utility. True nihilism has finally arrived. And yet, even this is interpretation. 
For, while this final era is Nietzsche’s own philosophy, his philosophy, too, is but another perspective, 
another paradigm. There may be others yet, for this is but an interpretation of an interpretation, a 
situational “truth” that may be overcome by the next step towards the apparent.  
 So why does quantum mechanics announce the arrival of nihilism for science? Quantum 
mechanics, the death of classical mechanics, destroys reason. Suddenly, postpositivism, the idea of 
disproof, collapses. How can disproof be true in a world where something can be both wave and 
particle? How can light respond however it is needed to respond. As shown in the discussions of Planck, 
disproof, at least in optics, is situational and perspectival. Quantum mechanics calls meaningfulness  
itself into question. In the classical world, images of the world were meaningful. In the quantum, a 
symbolic model is important in so far as it can be used, yet one model can easily be replaced for another 
that works better or converted for the same reason. Multiple, contradictory truths can be right, and 
some truths can still be true while also being false. Quantum mechanics, as with nihilism, questions the 
fundamental beliefs of science. 
 Unlike scientific determinism, which suggests a definite outcome, scientific nihilism recognizes 
the variability of truth and acknowledges the conditionality of truth. The apparent world has not yet 
been truly overcome, however. Quantum mechanics may be the beginning of scientific nihilism; still, it 





 Nietzsche’s strongest explanation of nihilism and the role of symbols and their human 
interactions, comes from his “On Truth and Lies in an Extra Moral Sense”. In this essay, Nietzsche tracks 
the human “urge for truth” (“On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense”, §4), and its relation to lie as a 
matter of the linguistic manipulation of symbols. 
 The social theorist may easily see the beginning of symbolic interactionism, and the Kuhnian will 
be quick to understand the role of paradigms. In both cases, this quickly leads to the talk of language 
within scientific concepts. First it must be established that since scientific nihilism depends upon a 
symbolic interpretative framework, the world exists in symbols. It must also be understood how symbols 
exist in a “true” world and what “true” means in a world of symbolic interactions. Nietzsche provides a 
starting point from which the Planckian concept of world symbols can be explored. The full essay details 
the entire evolution of the concepts of truth and lies, as well as the evolution of language.  
 The first claim important to a scientific dialogue that Nietzsche makes is that the concept of a lie 
is not, in itself, about actual truth. Instead, it is about agreed4 truths. The passage below illustrates this, 
 “For now that is fixed which henceforth shall be "truth"; that is, a regularly valid and obligatory 
designation of things is invented, and this linguistic legislation also furnishes the first laws of 
truth: for it is here that the contrast between truth and lie first originates. The liar uses the valid 
designations, the words, to make the unreal appear as real; he says, for example, "I am rich," 
when the word "poor" would be the correct designation of his situation. He abuses the fixed 
conventions by arbitrary changes or even by reversals of the names. When he does this in a self-
serving way damaging to others, then society will no longer trust him but exclude him. Thereby 
men do not flee from being deceived as much as from being damaged by deception: what they 
hate at this stage is basically not the deception but the bad, hostile consequences of certain 
kinds of deceptions. In a similarly limited way man wants the truth: he desires the agreeable life-
preserving consequences of truth, but he is indifferent to pure knowledge, which has no 
                                                          
4 The word agreed here refers to a collective combination of two different terms, which are of equal value. For 
Nietzsche, agreed refers to conventional; for Nietzsche the conventional represents that which had become an 
established set of rules, procedures, and meanings in science. However, in science, the terms conventional and 
consensual have separate meaning. Convention in science tends to refer to modelling and methods. While the 
convention of method is of interest here, convention for science refers specifically to practices, not philosophical 
knowledge. Instead, the term within scientific convention that comports with Nietzschean terminology would be 
consensus. This refers to agreed upon laws of natures, rules of science, ideas of knowledge, etc. A scientific 
consensus is reached by an agreeing body of knowledge or practitioners (scientists), just as convention is reached 
by an entrusted body of language practitioners (speakers) for Nietzsche.  
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consequences; he is even hostile to possibly damaging and destructive truths. And, moreover, 
what about these conventions of language? Are they really the products of knowledge, of the 
sense of truth? Do the designations and the things coincide? Is language the adequate 
expression of all realities?” 
— On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense”, §6 
 What Nietzsche demonstrates here, is that we desire truth, but not for truth itself. The desire 
for truth lies in its utility. Nietzsche calls desire also will or drive. Truth however, is elusive, inasmuch as 
truths are based on consensus of meaning. A man who lies deceives the expectations of the listener. 
Nietzsche’s example of poor and rich can be used to illustrate this. A man who calls himself rich but 
possesses nothing lies to the listener by deceiving him with the expectation of what rich means—namely 
material wealth. But, the man has not necessarily deceived his listener with objective untruth, because 
all of language is contextual. We may even be deceived by objective truth. This turnabout may clearly 
occur when that man makes a return reply, “I am rich in spirit”. Suddenly, we are no longer deceived, 
despite that the word has not changed. What has changed? By modifiying with “in spirit”, the listener 
understands the implicit “not in material wealth but”. Instead, the speaker has clarified that it is only in 
spirit. Is the man truly rich? Regardless, the man will still be a liar; this is because any who listens will 
expect material wealth. In essence, the nuanced usage and meaning determine truth and lie, not the 
objective reality behind the statement. 
 This linguistic argument is seemingly beyond science. However, it is already established that 
science is a necessarily interpretable text. Thus, science, as much as any other pursuit, linguistic. What is 
meant here is the same consequentialist understanding as with language. Language is used by Nietzsche 
to explain anything which has an agreed established representation of what is believed to be objective 
reality. Therefore, it may be said that “rich” and “poor” are but symbolic stand-ins for the actuality of 
“possessing money” and “possessing nothing”. Why is this so? Symbols work, they allow us to pursue 
our drives and urges to engage the world. However, this concept of utility is skewed. Technically, a 
negative symbol also has utility. This can be explained by looking at scientific symbols. 
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 The symbols of chemistry have, and continue to be, quite effective tools. They allow modelling 
of processes and their continuous functioning. However, symbols may become outdated—i.e., alchemy. 
Yet, this had utility at the time, but once it ceased to have utility, was deemed damaging to the utility of 
the new model. It was done away with. Yet the negative symbol has utility, if even just in bringing about 
the utility of the next model. 
 So, symbols are not simply about utility. Instead, the symbols must have some other hallmark to 
become symbols that can be interpreted as truth or lie. Nietzsche’s concept of benefit is useful. Instead 
of simply having utility, it is whether the symbol produces a beneficial or damaging “truth”. First, since 
the truth is agreed, and thus based on shared illusions, it is not about the real truth of the object. This 
then means we determines the meaning and truth of the object. Now, to determine what shall be 
“True”, man must determine the meaning and “truth” which helps to attain satisfaction. Meanwhile, the 
damaging and destructive truths are determined to be lies or inconsequential. They are forbidden. 
These become unusable symbols. 
 This now sets the stage for understanding scientific nihilism in light of world symbols. Regarding  
truths, since one may generally say science deals only in agreed upon symbols, science suggests symbols 
are the world and its interactions: the empirical nature of the world. Now, it is established symbols are 
not True, nor true, but “true”. Instead, the symbols are a simulation of the world. In much the same 
way, science, and especially quantum mechanics, touts itself as a simulation of the world. 
 The problem arises in the acknowledgment of knowledge and truth. In classical mechanics, the 
simulation is the world. In quantum mechanics, the simulation represents the world. This difference is 
part of why quantum mechanics necessitates so strong an epistemological change in science. 
Representation versus reality changes how universal law is conceived. In all cases, science deals with 
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symbols and images of the object, never with the object itself; however, the object is already a lie, and 
that is before it is further interpretation ad the imposition of scientific reason and scientific naturalism. 
 According to Nietzsche, “truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what 
they are” (“On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense”, §9). This is very much true in quantum 
mechanics; in Planck’s work, there is a recognition of the necessarily illusory status played by perception 
and the conception of an idea. As formerly discussed, wave-particle duality in light integrally includes 
this matter of symbols. The concept of even wave or particle is naturally a simulation, not a reality. As 
such, their meaning lies in their utility. At some point, one must recognize how light is not the 
simulation. It acts however it will, as light. This is not to say light is free-willed or human, but that 
imagined constraints are anthropomorphic from humanity as observers, as opposed to its noumenal 
natural constraints. Meanwhile, we continue to put constraints around it by the imposition of paradigms 
we find useful based on experience and chance. 
 Even these paradigms are just symbols. As Nietzsche puts it, science, which has long believed it 
works in nature, actually works in an “anthropomorphic world”. Science is an inherently human pursuit. 
As such, it cannot escape the importance of symbols, nor can it return to the thing itself. The problem 
then becomes the method. Since the method still relies on the concept of a discoverable, falsifiable, 
verifiable, reproduceable world, it fails to recognize the anthropomorphic nature of science. Even 
though quantum mechanics has foundationally challenged the concept, the physical world is still 
pursued “scientifically” without acknowledgement of anthropomorphism. Is there a way to get past the 
anthropomorphic world? 
Planckian Causality and World Symbols 
 Turning quickly to Planck’s writing on causality and symbols in physics helps to reveal what 
symbols mean to scientific practice. Planck’s the concept of a world-image derives from the basic idea of 
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causality. That is, causality in science is the idea that an event can be accurately predicted by developing 
models and laws. This gives rise to what Planck refers to as the Determinist and Indeterminist schools of 
thought. In the former case, it is believed that there are causal connections with inaccurate 
measurement (i.e., symbols). In the latter it is believed that the rules and causal connections themselves 
are inaccurate or not absolute. Focusing on the determinist path leads to modern and even classical 
science. The determinist realizes that the world contains inaccuracies as a result of anthropomorphic 
interactions. As such, no measurement is absolute. But the determinist, who still fully accepts causality, 
will suggest that the world is still causal, i.e., there are accurate predictions and universal rules. This 
seeming paradox, that the observable world which is observably inaccurate is governed by completely 
accurate rules to which it does not accurately adhere, is explainable when it is understood that the 
variables outside the control of the rule influence the exactitude of the measure. That is, the world is 
still wholly absolute, but there is no sufficient means to render the world into those absolutes. 
 This is why science relies upon symbols. Since observation is always dependent on inaccuracy, 
science must rely upon precise, mathematical models. These models are not, and cannot be, the 
observations. Thus, the scientist must rely upon something else to determine the rules of the world. 
Thus, the scientist relies on meaningful symbols. These symbols and their interactions constitute 
Planck’s world image, which consists only of symbols (The Philosophy of Physics, 51).  
 The process, which employed both classical and quantum mechanics, renders a system or 
property is made into a symbol and which is then transferred from the observable world into the world 
image. As a result, it loses its inexactitude and becomes absolute and precise. Following this, the worldly 
influences are likewise brought into the world image. The “liminal conditions” (those uncontrollable 
influences) have been defined symbolically and thus allow for modelling. From this model, calculations 
are performed to determine the world image’s definite functions. These are then translated back into 
the observable world; a translation from anthropomorphic back to anthropomorphic, according to 
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Planck, thereby allows proper approximation. However, the inaccuracy has not been reduced. Indeed, 
the inaccuracy has simply been passed on. Instead of the inaccuracy relying in the measurement, the 
inaccuracy has been passed forth into the predicting and approximating. In classical mechanics, this 
transference is often overlooked. It seems the inaccuracy and transference of it are unimportant. But, 
quantum mechanics changes things, such that this peripheral discussion transference of inaccuracy in 
symbols is important to how science may respond to the inaccuracy of anthropomorphism. 
 The temporary uncertainty, or phantomness, of quantum problems makes the concept of 
transferring inaccuracy troublesome. The world image of approximation allows belief in definite rules 
and causality and seems to allow for definite explanations to govern the world. But when a phantom 
system impinges, introducing uncertainty not simply in predicting but in transferring, the concept of a 
dual system, of a historically precedented system, and any type of Planckian or Nietzschean 
phantomness suggests that inaccuracy is not simply transferred to prediction, but is heightened at the 
point of transference. Indeed, inaccuracy is present even in the translation. That which is in the world 
image cannot be translated to sensation (the empirical world), and thus the definite functions 
themselves may not accurately apply to whatever situation into which they have been transferred. 
 One may then say that quantum mechanics, which has answered some of these uncertain 
questions, has solved the problem and expect a solution. Unfortunately, even for Planck, it is not true. 
This perhaps reveals why Planck was so staunchly against quantum designation. Quantum mechanics is 
not the solution to a determinist world image. Instead, it is simply an evolution of determinism. 
Quantum mechanics produces a new causal mechanism that seeks to apply a new deterministic 
causality to the world from another perspective. In other words, quantum mechanics faces the same 
difficulty as classical mechanics despite its having most clearly revealed the trouble with causal world 
images in response to symbols. 
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 Instead of changing the rules of causality, quantum mechanics has changed the symbols and the 
rules of the world. The inaccuracy of transferring, from observation to world image and vice versa, the 
inaccuracy pointed out by Nietzsche, is still present. Indeed, measurement itself interferes with 
measurement, thus causality seems a fair position in light of indeterminist solutions. But Planck has no 
solution. Neither the indeterminist nor the determinist position are entirely tenable. Indeed, both are 
self-contradictory in ways that are against the very value they provide. Thus it is that the world of 
symbols, of a lack of accuracy (and inability to make accurate predictions), leads the collapse of scientific 
determinism. 
Nietzschean Concept of Facts 
 The trouble of the quantum question is the trouble of determinism. Science needs 
definite, objective, absolute answers and laws. Therefore, the paradoxical problem of science lies 
in its pursuit of facts. The problem more specifically is in its need of certainty. The trouble raised 
by the quantum question is perspectivism. The quantum reveals the perspectival, situational, and 
provisional nature of facts. Moreover, the inaccuracy introduced by world images and symbols, 
leads to a perspectivism that confounds both indeterminism and determinism. In essence, the 
concept of facticity, is questioned by the development of quantum mechanics. Originally, this, is 
paradoxical due to the way scientific determinism allowed the establishment of the 
nonobjectivity of facts. That is, the absolute facts of quantum science have determined objective 
nonobjectivity, but in so doing cannot proceed for science depends upon deterministic objective 
fact.  
 Therefore, to understand the nature of the quantum phantom, and to determine if there is 
a solution, a Nietzschean exploration of facticity is useful.  This was briefly touched previously. 
In a passage from his unpublished notebooks Nietzsche states: 
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 “Against positivism, which remains with the phenomenon, "there are only facts," I 
would say: no, precisely facts do not exist, only interpretations. We cannot find a fact "in 
itself": maybe it's nonsense to want something like that. "It is all subjective," you say: but 
even that is interpretation, the "subject" is not given, but something additional-grounded, 
behind it-is it ultimately necessary to put the interpreter behind the interpretation? That is 
already poetry, hypothesis. 
 
 As far as the word "knowledge" has meaning, the world is recognizable: but it is 
interpretable differently, it has no meaning behind it, but innumerable senses of 
"perspectivism." 
 
 Our needs are those that interpret the world: our drives and their pros and cons. Every 
instinct is a kind of domination, everyone has their perspective, which he wants to impose 
as a norm on all other impulses.” 
—Nietzsche, Nachlass, 7 §60 (1886-1887) 
Here, Nietzsche makes the devastating claim that our presuppositions about reality are 
themselves metaphysical and the nature we discuss are also a matter of interpretation. The point 
here is that even the basis for our facts, the objective world, is in itself non-objective. It too is 
dependent on our knowing and observing, so these “facts” are interpretations.  
 The counterclaim to this seemingly morally relativist (perhaps even objectively 
determinist) claim is that even this claim of facts is an interpretation, that his knowledge of the 
situation of knowledge is in itself an absolute truth claim. Nietzsche states that this claim of 
nonobjectivity is itself an interpretation of the “facts” present. However, this is where the true 
discourse as it relates to scientific knowledge begins. The trouble with the quote in its shorter 
form is that it leaves open no room for a discipline based on occasionally absolute claims. So, 
this quote should be understood in its entirety, not as a theory of relativism, but in line with 




 However, this accounting of Nietzsche is necessarily different from the typical 
relativist stance. While many note that Nietzsche is an error theorist, inasmuch as he argues for 
the lack of moral truth, (Pidgen, 2015; Leiter, 2015), what is an error theorist? 
 According to Richard Joyce, the error theorist holds that (i) “Morality conceptually 
involves non-institutional categorical imperatives” and (ii) “In fact, non-institutional categorical 
imperatives are indefensible”. Or, more succinctly, “The moral error theorist thinks that moral 
language and moral thinking aim at the truth (i.e., that moral language is assertoric and moral 
thinking doxastic) but that they systematically fail to secure it.” (2010). Perhaps, more to the 
point for the work at hand, according to Joyce, a moral error theorist “maintains that moral 
judgments are truth-evaluable assertions, but that the world doesn’t contain the properties to 
render moral judgments true” (2013). Thus the moral error theorist believes one can make moral 
claims (i.e., claims with moral judgment that have an absolute answer) but that the real world is 
non-objective and thus does not provide truths to defend such an assertion.  
 This may, at first, seem disconnected from the Nietzschean quote above. After all, 
Nietzsche talks about facts, interpretations, and about a lack of meaning. He does not seem, at 
first glance, to indicate at all that truth claims are possible. However, Nietzsche’s full quote gives 
the clear answer. He talks first of the lack of a grounded subject from which one can base a 
factual claim; i.e., the existence only of interpretations. He then speaks about innumerable 
perspectives which arise from the lack of meaning. Reworded slightly: there are no facts but only 
subjective experiences of the world. These subjective experiences then lend to multiple 
perspectives. This still sounds like moral relativism; however, according to Joyce, a moral 
relativist may hold that there is truth only from each subjective experience. In other words, the 
moral relativist believes there are no absolute truths, but that within each relativistic sphere 
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(perspective), that truth is objective. Meanwhile, the error theorist believes there are absolutes in 
the world (i.e., the monetary value of an item), but that there are no objective underlying values. 
 Nietzsche’s greater point is not simply—and possibly not at all—an ethical one. 
Indeed, Nietzsche here is critiquing the idea of knowledge and of empiricism as naturalistic fact. 
Of course, this can be seen through analysis in the same way as the error theorist. Nietzsche says 
there is no fact, only interpretation. 
 At this point, one would think that Nietzsche is a relativist. It is exactly opposite. Joyce 
gives the example of a tyrant selling a fish. As above, the relativist believes in a lack of absolutes 
but the existence of objective facts from which those relative facts derive; i.e., a fish exists but 
whether or not we only call it a fish is dependent on how we perceive it. However, like the error 
theorist, Nietzsche suggests there is a lack of objective fact (i.e., that we know the world as 
subjects). Joyce uses the example of a tyrant selling fish as an example; when a tyrant sets the 
price of fish at $5, it is absolutely $5. The dollar figure is not relative. It is not objectively $5, 
i.e., the value of the fish set by the tyrant is not a given fact of the world. Nietzsche calls into 
question not how the “fish” is perceived, but that the fish is a fish in the first place. Like, Joyce’s 
tyrant, Nietzsche questions whether the value of the fish, not only its monetary value but in its 
status as an absolute idea (eidoi) is truly a given. All we know about our world is interpretation, 
according to Nietzsche. Moreover, “even [this] is interpretation” (Nietzsche, 1886-87, Nachlass, 
7 §60). Does this make the above statement relativistic? Not at all. Simply, to say that the world 
is objectively only interpretation denies the lack of objectivity in the world. In other words, 
things may or may not be solely nonobjective. Suddenly, the world gets more complicated. 
 To answer the question, “Are there objective facts”, the questioner must first find an 
answer to how to objectively answer the question. This is a circular paradox. But to answer “Is 
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the world non-objective/subjective”, the questioner must contradict his or her answer with their 
method or arrive at the same circularity. This is indeed the same conundrum posed by quantum 
scientific determinism at the beginning of this discussion of facticity. The only solution is 
Nietzsche’s: the world is non-objectively non-objective. 
 More to the point, the way we interpret the world naturally determines the result. The 
method we use to test the world is itself an interpretation which means that whether or not there 
are objective facts, we are already beyond any actual fact that may exist. There is no way to 
interact with the world other than making an interpretation. Definite results are the conclusion, 
not of objective facts, but of absolutist methods. In other words, Nietzsche’s claim suggests we 
only have reproduceable “fact” because we have determined what we believe are absolute 
methods, not because the results are actually definite or objective. Such “facts” then are always 
open to revision, which for Nietzsche, includes the likelihood that each revision is an error. The 
error may be necessary and important error, but an error nonetheless. Error is not problem, at 
least in Nietzsche’s mind, since error is a given. Instead it is the dominance of “knowledge”, or 
rather what we have come to regard as knowledge. This is part of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. For 
Nietzsche, replacing one idea or interpretation for another happens because it is more sonorous—
it resonates with our drives and urges and comports with our concepts of convenience. This is 
much like Kuhn’s concept of paradigms in which one illusion of absolute fact is replaced for 
another. What then of paradigmism and perspectivism. If all we know of the world are images, 
are not all answers valid? Is science but a futile, self-satisfactory attempt of sating our urges for 
truth? If so, then does quantum mechanics imply all is naught and science is ended?  
 Luckily, for science, no. Even Nietzsche’s concept of facts is not so closed. Instead, all 
answers may be valid, although some answers will necessarily be better than others. For 
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Nietzsche, these answers will not be inherently more factual, but they will be more fulfilling and 
satisfactory. If so, then science may proceed. Not all perspectives are valid. Instead, science now 
must determine what makes a better perspective or a better answer. On the other hand, science 
also is at a loss. If facticity is not the true drive, if objective answers are not obtainable, what 
makes one perspective, answer, or method better than another? 
The Will to Truth 
 Perhaps the problem with scientific determinism lies not in the error of the worl. It may 
also not be in the error of translating—that is, in interpreting and humanizing in different ways— 
but there is nothing inherently wrongful with this error either, despite it being possibly in 
constant error. The problem, the root of phantomness, lies possibly instead in the value and 
meaning of truth as it relates to determinism. 
 It has been suggested already that determinism itself is opposed to truths that 
determinism has produced. Truth is opposed to determinism, though truth is the goal of 
determinism. This paradox is itself part of the phantom problem. Truth in the first type of 
phantomness may change, and therefore solubility and utility of a phantom problem may change. 
In the second type of phantom problem, truth may rely upon provisional truth—i.e., Truth may 
not be true but “true”. In the third type of phantom problem, truth is perspectival—i.e., truth is 
instead collective “truths”.  
 Why is one truth better than another, if it is, and what objective judgment, if any, does 
better hold? Methodologically, science has an answer. This answer depended upon the following 
3 factors: theory, progressivity, and consistency, all considered within a context of historicity. 
But, as pointed out with Thagard, this is also true of pseudoscience. 
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  In Nietzschean terms, scientific truth fulfills the drive for truth but is not 
necessarily satisfied by absolute truth. Scientific truth is sometimes pseudoscientific and 
scientific at others, consistent with Thagard’s concept of historicity such that pseudoscience in 
one era may fulfill truth inn another 
In On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, Nietzsche states, “truths are illusions about 
which one has forgotten that this is what they are” (§9). Until this point, the discussion has 
focused on the illusory nature of truth both in Nietzsche’s philosophy and in scientific discovery. 
But, what does it mean that one forgets the illusionary nature of truth is truth is a human desire? 
Human urge is satisfied by the illusions of truth, despite that no truth is given.  
Having forgotten that this truth is but an illusion allows these “truths” to be understood as 
noumena. “The venerability, reliability, and utility of truth is something which a person 
demonstrates for himself from the contrast with the liar, whom no one trusts and everyone 
excludes” (On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, § 10).  In short, science acts as truth, 
working on the basis of a symbolic world-image applicable to the world only in error by 
convincing others of the veracity of its status by fulfilling the truth urge. Scientific determinism 
is but lie in a larger sense. 
Why this urge exists and why, which is orthogonal to that there is a drive, is of equal 
importance. Why must man pursue truth?  
“Our needs are those that interpret the world: our drives and their pros and cons. Every instinct is 
a kind of domination, everyone has their perspective, which he wants to impose as a norm on all 
other impulses.” 
—Nietzsche, Nachlass, 7 §60 (1886-1887) 
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There is a drive to interpret the world that follows our desire to dominate. This impulse is 
imposed upon the world and others. The drive is truth and the will is power. For science, the 
knowledge becomes a replacement for power. 
 Nietzsche explains that every one wills him- or herself to power in such a way that 
his/her drives always point towards this will, even if unconsciously.  
` “…Accordingly, I do not believe that a "drive for knowledge" is the father of philosophy; 
but rather that another drive has, here as elsewhere employed knowledge (and mis-
knowledge!) as a mere instrument. But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to 
see to what extent they may have been at play just here as in inspiring spirits (or demons 
and kobolds—), will find that all of them have done philosophy at some time—and that 
every single one of them would like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate 
purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives. For every drive is 
domineering: and as such it attempts to philosophize.— To be sure: among scholars who 
are really scientific men things may be different—"better," if you like—, there you may 
really find something like a drive for knowledge, some small independent clockwork that, 
once well wound, works on vigorously without any essential participation from all the 
other drives of the scholar. The real "interests" of the scholar therefore lie usually 
somewhere else, in his family, say, or in making money, or in politics; indeed, it is almost 
a matter of total indifference whether his little machine is placed at this or that spot in 
science, and whether the "promising" young worker turns himself into a good philologist 
or an expert on fungi or a chemist:—it does not characterize him that he becomes this or 
that. In the philosopher conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and 
above all his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is—that is, in what 
order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.” 
—Beyond Good and Evil, §6 
Philosophy, for Nietzsche, is the attempt to satisfty power-cravings through knowledge. 
Likewise, the scientist, as a natural philosopher, is in the same position. He or she imposes their 
will upon nature forcing it to conform to a concept.  
For Nietzsche, science is a schema which us “to volatize perceptual metaphors” and 
“dissolve an image into a concept” (“On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense”, §10).  
 
“For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved 
with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes 
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and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly 
marked boundaries—a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of 
first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the 
immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world. Whereas 
each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals and is therefore able to elude 
all classification, the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of a Roman 
columbarium and exhales in logic that strength and coolness which is characteristic of 
mathematics.”  
—“On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, §10. 
Schemas exist as a subjugation of nature, which to Nietzsche is full of more than mere 
mathematical representation. These schema contribute a full grasp of Niezsche’s perspectivism. 
The schema is contraindicated by the illusory nature of truth just the same way that the earlier 
Nietzschean phantom is. Because the schema is but one in a multitude of provisional, 
perspectival, nonobjectively nonobjective perspectives, it gives rise to the dominance of specific 
and singular ideals. 
 Truth leads to claims of power. These claims, which depend upon the absolutist 
objectivist view of truth, are in themselves illusory and built upon a divide which is inherently 
unachievable. In other words, the power derived from truth is itself a lie. But, the value of “truth” 
is determined by its ability to satisfy this will to power. “Truth” is that which resonates with us—
it comports with our desires, our will, and our needs, as well as our situatedness. With it, we 
satisfy the need for power while having to submit to it. What is best is that which gives in to 
these desires and fits with the perspective that adapts most easily to these desires. Science, then, 
is simply the agreed adherence to this hierarchical domination of orthodoxy over unorthodoxy. 





Since it is fair, then, to say that better scientific concepts are not necessarily more 
objectively truthful, or necessarily more generally useful, but ones more resonant with human 
desires within each subjective experience applied to an agreed upon world image, then what can 
we make of utility. Simply, if resonates with the will to power, there must be some other way of 
looking at the world that allows for what may otherwise not resonate to become resonant. How 
do we explain the resonance of quantum physics with classical thinkers in the original 
conception of the quantum. In other words, how do the solutions to phantom problems overcome 
cognitive dissonance and lead to resonance? How does quantum overtake the classical?   
Nietzsche’s perspectivism, like Kuhnian paradigmism, adds to this concept of 
perspectivism in useful ways. The lack of objective truth requires that multiple interpretations of 
the world exist that result from our will to power over nature. These interpretations are situated 
in a Nietzschean horizon, by which the world is ultimately governed5.  
 “Consider any morality with this in mind: what there is in it of "nature" teaches hatred of 
the laisser aller, of any all-too-great freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons 
and the nearest tasks—teaching the narrowing of our perspective, and thus in a certain 
sense stupidity, as a condition of life and growth. “  
—Beyond Good and Evil, §188 
 Here, Nietzsche addresses the narrowing of knowledge that has thus far been discussed. 
The current scientific practice of reductionism teaches that a perspective must be informed in a 
certain way to lead to a correct end. In essence, there are better truths which guide scientific 
knowledge, and only those better truths can be taken. Better, here, is still historical, such that 
                                                          
5 Horizon is a Nietzschean term that ultimately refers to a person’s situatedness in the world. Specifically, it 
references the basic assumptions that someone carries about the world. This could almost be conflated with a 
Kuhnian paradigm except that the horizon is individualistic. Neither society nor the scientific community sit upon a 
horizon. Instead, the individual practitioners each carry with them a horizon/(-s), a perspective from which they 
view the world, which is influenced by the paradigm that the community takes. Meanwhile, the Nietzschean 
concept of a perspective is also different, as the perspective is made up of the various horizons which comprise a 
person’s individual viewpoint. 
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Nietzsche would likely approve of the matter historicity and reinterpretation. However, there is 
no acknowledgement of these values. Read as a critique of science, Nietzsche accuses science, of 
discovering truth by limiting horizons. So, truth does not serve to expand knowledge. Rather it 
reduces it by designating particular agreed upon paradigms that align with particular agreed upon 
horizons. One consequence is the self-confirming nature of orthodox science. A second is the 
recognition of consensus as determining a better truth. 
 But this does not get at the heart of why some truths are more reasonable to an individual, 
just what social factors affect the development of more reasonable truths. We must turn to a 
different Nietzschean concept. According to Nietzsche, “We hear only the questions to which 
we are capable of finding an answer” (The Gay Science, Book V, §196). This finally provides a 
real answer. Reasonable and resonant truths are dependent upon the horizon just discussed. It is 
not that truth is resonant with us, but that we resonate with it. Nietzsche’s damning statement is a 
turnabout of a basic empirical premise: we are capable of finding answers to only those things 
we can adequately question. Or, we have a limited set of answers based upon the phantom nature 
of science and the world. 
 But, if so, then it is not that we can answer whatever we question. If that were the case, 
then a change in perspective could not change the answer. The answer should remain the same, 
for it should reveal all the correct answers. Instead, a reluctance to accept reality and truth’s 
desires to maintain their hidden parts, leads to the inability to account for our own inability. Thus 
the rise of empiricism. But by quantum mechanics and Planck’s phantomness have exposed the 
error of empiricism. Thus, the dogmatic claims of science now support Nietzsche’s philosophical 
claim: facts are not discoverable, but producible.  
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 Thus, the only questions we can answer are those we have already developed a 
satisfactory answer for. Those questions we have already answered, even if not consciously, are 
those we can ask and explore. The truth which resonates with us is that we have already 
determined from our horizons. Resonant truths are those which support our prefabricated notions 
of truth and lead to questions that reveal those prefabricated truths. 
 But, then, one may ask, how did quantum mechanics come to exist? Did it not undermine 
classic mechanics by answering the question that classical mechanics did not, could not, ask? 
Here now, we return to a point made much earlier. Planck developed an answer and then later 
solved the problem he developed. This is in line with the Nietzschean claim. He heard an answer 
and followed. But this alone is not necessarily a fatal blow for science. 
 The truth is that quantum mechanics is still deterministic. Indeed, the solution to 
blackbody radiation which lead to quantum mechanics was ultimately a rephrasing of the 
original question to find the answer of determinism. How did it do so in a different light? It 
allowed the bending of other truths which ceased to resonate. But what about the damages dealt 
to certainty? Once again, the problem was not with certainty. Everyone knew about uncertainty, 
the issue was degree. And once the possibility was opened, there was already an answer, one just 
needed a push to shift the horizon towards uncertainty, such as the ultraviolet catastrophe. 
Quantum mechanics is a set of truths that resonated with those that the failings of other 
explanations of blackbody radiation did not resonate with.  
 It may be said, then, that resonant truth is that which aligns with preformed notions of the 
world. Resonant truth is governed by perspective, horizon, and interpretation. If that’s the case, 
the final issue arises. Kuhn suggests that truths are accepted based upon their value. This is also 
true for Nietzsche. But their resonance is based upon perception. When talking about science, 
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resonant truths are determined from that which corresponds to the symbolic truths developed by 
determinism to create a paradigm to control nature. When that control is questioned, such as 
when a paradigm fails, if the failure is recognized, the resonance ceases. Resonance is 
determined by a truths ability to maintain a power structure and the need to replace that power 
structure if need be. But with this in mind, what method can account for hearing questions we 
cannot know? What allows us to find answers we don’t expect? And how can a method account 
for the potential of perspectivism? Finally, if science develops off of conflict and cognitive 





A Marriage of Planckian Ideas with Nietzschean Philosophy 
 
What has been demonstrated to this point is simply that there are Nietzschean philosophical models 
which may accurately be pursued to similar conundrums as the quantum mechanical model and that 
there is a Planckian quantum mechanical model that is a phantom. In turn, each imply a certain 
rendering of the external world. And certain concepts of phantomness have been explained in such a 
way that both connect. 
 However, the findings of both are intimately connected in such a way that the answer to the 
question for science may, potentially, be pointed towards a solution. Namely, the question is two-fold. 
First, from the consideration of the Planckian phantom, what sort of mode of scientific inquiry can be 
applied that accounts for and uses the implications of phantomness? Second, from the Nietzschean 
philosophical school, is there a paradigmatic science that recognizes the perspectival nature of 
questions and answers such that it can produce and answer questions outside the normal deterministic 
approach of science? Both of these questions may be generally reproduced in this way: is there a 
modification that can be made to scientific approach such that inquiry can be successfully made and 
produce practical results regarding a nonobjectively nonobjective, anthropomorphic world? Is there a 
way to interact with the world image as a world image, rather than as the world? 
World Phantoms 
 If there is an answer to how may scientific inquiry address phantomness, then phantomness is a 
necessary starting point. Of course, in the larger, broader question, this is simply addressing the 
question of nonobjectively nonobjective anthropomorphisms. But, indeed, it is not simply a question of 
how. Instead, one must first understand what is phantom in science. 
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 Up until this point, this author has accepted the premise, unquestioningly, there are 3 types of 
Planckian phantoms that are governed largely by the Thagardian description of pseudoscience 
presented before and which appear occasionally throughout science. These were generally that of error, 
vagueness, and perspective. Nietzsche describes the major category of phantomness such that all three 
types are brought into one umbrella within a description of phantom: nonobjective problems. Thus, it 
may be said the three types of phantom problems all occur from some issue of nonobjectivity. 
Erroneous assumptions produce nonobjective answers, for the answer itself is erroneous. Vagueness 
produces nonobjective answers for it creates states of superposition within single paradigms and 
perspectives. Perspective creates nonobjective answers for in it exists multiple absolute answers from 
the same absolute situation, but with different underlying, possibly convincing assumptions. Planck here 
creates the specific framework for the types of phantomness observed while Nietzsche gives the 
explanation for what creates the phantom. 
 But, there is an even finer point. Planck suggests that this describes some problems. There are 
any number of Planckian examples. The best example, though, it the quantum problem that Planck 
himself creates. It is never noted within Planck’s body of work that the question of blackbody radiation, 
and of quantum mechanics as a whole, is indeed a phantom problem. This designation has been 
provided in full before, but it is established that the whole problem fulfills the necessary qualifications as 
a phantom problem. The truths revealed by quantum mechanics are answers to a phantom problem. 
This leads to the development of uncertainty and troubles with an objective world, especially in the 
realm of light and the wave-particle duality. 
 It is not the specific answer, however, that is problematic. As Nietzsche reveals, the problem of 
uncertainty is not actually a problem. Error existed before. Error is sometimes necessary. In fact, error is 
a necessary byproduct of anthropomorphism. Error is part of the world. Then, when compared with 
Planckian concepts of the world image, it is evident that error is necessary part of interacting with the 
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world image. It is simply the understanding that has changed: we now realize that error is inescapable, 
and the world cannot be readily determined. Therefore, it is not error that is the problem for science.  
 If error was already built in, then perhaps the candidate for understanding the relationship 
between a scientific method and phantomness lies in perspective or vagueness. However, Nietzsche 
once again becomes key. The answer to these problems seems, at surface, to possibly be in finding the 
correct paradigm. Nietzsche shows it is not the case; there is no such thing as a correct perspective. 
There are multitudes of perspectives. Each perspective is in itself an interpretation. The “correctness” of 
this interpretation is simply based upon the value of that interpretation to give man the illusion of truth 
so as to give him power over nature. It satisfies truth claims, while not being truth. In other words, there 
is never a correct perspectives, but many perspectives will varying resonance based upon their 
situational utility. Perspective is not the issue for there may not be an absolute objective perspective. 
 Then what is the problem? The problem is the designation. Planck’s phantomness is key to 
understanding scientific progress. Planck correctly designated and described the phantom problem. 
What Nietzsche adds to this designation is a caveat.  While Planck shows the phantomness of some 
problems, Nietzsche reveals that all problems are in actuality phantom problems. 
 Based on this, then, the progress of science is necessarily phantom progress. Unfortunately, this 
reveals the way the scientific world may actually work. In other words, all problems are phantoms, and 
thus all problems ultimately can be regarded as perspectival. In this, no single answer of paradigm is of 
ultimate importance. Simple, there is a World Phantom, which is the world itself from which we 
generate our symbols. It is not the objective world, but the seemingly objective with which we 
constantly interact. It is presented as the objective world, when indeed, it is just the subjective 
anthropomorphic reality which we can achieve.  
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 Now the true problem, and answer, is presented. Instead of science being about finding the 
correct paradigm, instead it is about discovering paradigms in general. But discovery of paradigms, 
which is answering phantom problems, depends on seeming objectivity. This means that we cannot 
truly discover the world, only that world with which we are easily provided answers understandable by 
our own situatedness in the world and our perspective.  
 Simply, that all problems are phantom problems means that science is an anthropomorphic text. 
To create valuable paradigms requires not a discovery of correct paradigms, but an ability to change 
perspective. Of course, to change perspective requires an ability to hear and answer questions other 
than those which are resonant with our current perspectives and situatedness—that is, to hear and 
answer what is beyond our current grasp to hear and answer.  
 Of course, this paradoxical problem is itself an answer. The original premise of science that 
allows for designation towards truth is that there are indeed necessary truths. It is these necessary 
truths that lead to issues of situatedness, as these necessary truths are those which impinge upon what 
can or cannot be discovered. Thus, the first answer to developing an (Un)certain science is the removal 
of necessary truth. This is easy enough already by recognizing provisionality. However, provisionality is 
much harder to apply. In such a science, it is necessary every “truth’ begin “if”, and if is not practical in 
an all-encompassing discipline. 
 Therefore, what can be done? This is where paradigmism comes to play. Perspectivism requires 
recognizing the subjectivity of the world—that is, it’s nonobjectivity. Meanwhile, paradigmism means 
recognizing the constant provisionality. For such a science to exist and remain viable, “if” must be rolled 
into the perspective. That is, instead of making broad truth claims provisional, another method is 
possible. Namely, the provisionality may be transferred from one claim to one perspective. This then 
means that the provisionality is not of every active pursuit of truth, but inherent to each world model. 
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That is, the “if” claim becomes manageable. Now, instead of “if this is true about the world”, the claim 
may be said “if the world truly acts as x”. Thus, the birth of a paradigm that is aware of its perspectival 
paradigmatic nature. Since acting here refers to a broader claim about the law of the world, as opposed 
to the individual results, the issue has been solved by considering not individual phantom problems but 
by acknowledging the world phantoms. That is, by considering all problems to be phantom problems, 
the paradox that arises is solved by the very designation—a world of phantom problems means that 
substitution of the paradigm or perspective as the provisional solves the trouble that is posed by 
consideration of the world as nonobjective. 
 Now, with a completely phantom world, an objective discipline still works, for it deals with 
provisional objectivity. That is, all statements may be rephrased, “within this paradigm” or “from this 
perspective” and still maintain a hint of objective truth. This conditional “if” can also be understood 
without explicit statement, so long as the paradigm and its associated symbols are well acknowledged. 
Suddenly, science has been freed, partly, from determinism. Each problem may be explored 
perspectivally and without the bias of deterministic paradigmism. Problems that are pseudoscientific 
under a Thagardian definition can still be scientifically explored with the recognition of the provisionality 
of their nonphantom nature. But, it is always up to the scientist, the discoverer, to always remember 
and tell the significance of that paradigm or perspective upon the results.  
 
The Provisionality of Provisionality 
 There is however a certain determinism even in this claim. As already stated, the world is 
nonobjectively nonobjective. In short, the world may or may not be nonobjective. Thus, it must be said 
that the before discussed paradigmism is itself a paradigmatic designation just as perspectivism is a 
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perspectival answer. Just as any given perspective is useful in its value to us, so too perspectivism itself 
may be an unnecessary assumption. 
 This does not mean not considering it. In fact, quite the opposite. It means that it must be used 
and not used as befits the value it produces in its use. Classical mechanics, for all its failure to answer 
blackbody radiation, was itself useful. It was valuable. In short, it failed to answer some questions, but 
succeeded in providing comforting illusions to many others. Should classical mechanics be dealt away 
with because it was not perspectival? 
 Just as Planck answered, no. Instead, it should be understood to be a perspectival answer that 
did not consider itself a perspective. This allowed it to give the sorts of answers it did. This does not 
make it valueless, for to be valueless means to claim classicalism lacked truth just as objectively as it 
claimed those truths. The answer is not simply integrating provisionality.  
 Rather, that would be stifling in the same way not recognizing it is. The answer is to use 
provisionality to better understand and interpret the world. It is a tool, to be substituted and used. This 
can be framed in another more scientific way. Based on Nietzsche, paradigms change based upon 
valuation. The paradigms are just a reflection of the current listener’s values. As those values change to 
conflict with the science, so too do the paradigms. If we accept this, then we must also accept the use of 
the same criteria to interrogate perspectivism, paradigmism, and provisionality. Phantomness, which is 
not so interrogable because it exists beyond the body of value and rather in the nonobjective world 
itself, shows that these values too are nonobjective claims to objectivity that may and must be changed 
to give a broader depth of answers. Orthodox science up to now has been so lacking in these that 
claiming they ought be integrated is easy; it is comparatively hard to argue that in so doing, one must 
remember this may and should be changed as necessary.  
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 More simply, quantum mechanics revealed the failures of determinism, and in so doing became 
deterministic. Quantum mechanics, which seems to be provisionality at its best, has actually become 
objectivity at its worst. Quantum mechanics, based on this simple understanding of nonobjectivity, must 
not be the end. It is but another perspective in a long line of perspectives; another translation of the 
world waiting to be reinterpreted. So too with perspectivism. And thus it is with (Un)certain science—
the only way it can maintain viability is for it to remember its place; it may and possibly should change, 
and the answers it gives while recognizing provisionality are in themselves provisional too, and thus may 
not be the best answers. Provisionality in such a science must also be provisional, lest (un)certain 




 Returning once more now to ability to recognize provisionality, there is a problem. That problem 
is that provisionality seems to be dependent on recognizing the way in which a problem varies to 
produce various answers. However, this limited view of phantomness ignores the much larger point 
made by Planck’s discoveries and Nietzsche’s critical lens placed upon it. The issue is not simply in the 
phantomness of problems, but in the phantomness of answers and phenomena. 
 A viable science, a science which is science, requires a recognition of phantomness as a 
legitimate entity. It was stated before that phantom problems are not soluble by scientific exploration. 
This is demonstrably misleading, for it has already been established that in reality all problems are 
phantom problems, just possibly ones for which we have yet to see their phantom natures. It is 
therefore scientific to recognize that science is grounded in a deterministsic naturalism that is opposed 
by the nature of the world. Simply, a viable science recognizes that phantomness is indeed scientific. 
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 Moreover, a viable science recognizes that the objective natural world is indeed nonobjectively 
nonobjective. Once again, this is misleading. How can an objective world be nonobjective in any 
fashion? A viable science must reframe the concept of objectivity. Instead of focusing upon absolute 
validity, perhaps a new framework is required. 
 As was mentioned much earlier, science in general thought is believed to be based upon 
verifiability, falsifiability, reproducibility, repeatability, and other hypotheticals. It is epitomized in the 
so-called scientific method. But, this method relies on objectivity, and especially upon absolute, 
objective, dichotomous logic. Such a science is starkly opposed to phantomness.  
 Instead, science must recognize phantomness. Within phantomness, the concept of 
perspectivism has already been well established both in the Nietzschean and Planckian lens. Now it can 
be applied to the concept of what is and is not scientific. Phantomness disregards these -abilities that 
others use to describe science. Phantomness begs the question of whose. Whose falsifiability? Whose 
verifiability? Whose reproducibility? It furthermore questions the very nature of these in the first place. 
Therefore, the first methodological implication is the removal of these terms from the definition of 
science to be relegated to only a definition science among multiplicitous possible definitions of science. 
 However, this still raises the issue of the Thagardian definition of pseudoscience, which until this 
point has been held as a viable definition. Science is that which is more progressive over time and 
reduces inaccuracies. Such a definition has seemed fitting with everything presented by considerations 
of phantomness so far. This is not actually fair. Because of the use of progress and inaccuracy, 
recognition of phantomness now raises a major concern about this definition within metholodogical 
implications. 
 First, progress is a linear idea. The points have already been raised that a problem can progress 
to and from phantomness (insofar as it becomes scientific and pseudoscientific within the body public) 
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without true major changing of the seeming objective nature of the world. Simply, progress is still a 
determinist method of reducing the anthropomorphic considerations of empirical study. Unfortunately, 
science and pseudoscience are inherently human. There is no way that progress can be achieved if the 
natural world is nonobjective. 
 This is because progress relies on a building up of correctness. Progress relies on the defeat of 
one theory to the success of the next. Progress is a way of ignoring the human effects on knowledge. 
Linear progress is only possible when a truer reality can be discovered. Since truth is illusory, any 
progress achieved is only seeming progress. Thus, already the first principle of science is dissolved. 
There is no way to truly be more progressive, for there is always progress, the question is just towards 
or in support of which perspectives and paradigms. The theory of chemistry as it stands may or may not 
need changing, but that does not make it a bad perspective. Meanwhile, the theory of heliocentrism, far 
more progressive for a much longer time, perhaps did need changing. Thus, the question of progress is 
thrown upon its head by phantomness. The first step to recognizing phantomness is understanding this 
about progress. 
 How can such an understanding occur? The first step is to remember the past. As 
anthropomorphic texts, scientific perspectives and paradigms do not exist in ideological vaccums. They 
arise from previous values and assumptions. It is of supreme importance then to remember the 
influence these values, ideas, and symbols had upon the current understandings and perspectives. It is 
possible that these must be changed, or at least understood, to get a clear picture of ways in which they 
may be solved (or fail to be solved) otherwise. 
 The second problem of Thagardian pseudoscience is the reducing of inaccuracies. It is a baseline 
assumption that discrepancies between the model and perceived reality automatically represent 
pseudoscience, inasmuch as not trying to solve them indicates a lack of ability to rightly explain the 
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phenomena. This is only partly fair. The phantom problem reveals the fairer nature. Discrepancies, as 
Planck and Nietzsche note, as revealed by the world image, are a byproduct of the world itself. They are 
inherent to the nonobjectively nonobjective world. Uncertainty exists. 
 People, namely scientists, try to reduce inaccuracy as much as possible. In so doing, they simply 
transfer it. In other words, the error in a model is not the problem. The model may or may not be 
accurate—that is beyond the model itself. Instead, the true value in the model is its value to us in 
understanding some facet of an issue. There may be problems for which grossly inaccurate models are 
better truth illusions. Some problems like this already exist, epigenetics in human development for 
instance as opposed to the Mendelian model. But, if we accept the Thagardian definition, a quite truly 
orthodox scientific position, then we must accept that such a discrepancy in the model creates a 
pseudoscience. There is no room in orthodox science for these two competing, simultaneously accurate 
and inaccurate models, to both be fair models. Yet, it is the case. 
 This tells the second epistemological consideration for phantomness. Science, to recognize 
phantomness, much recognize provisionality, but in a special sense. It must remember the importance 
of value rather than necessarily of complete accuracy. Recognizing phantomness may mean learning to 
approach problems from angles that highlight specific issues, rather than the whole. This then means 
ignoring universality. A viable science must recognize the un-universality of universality to be able to 
recognize phantomness. 
 
The New Paradigmism 
 This too then means something special about scientific paradigms and their construction. This 
viable science now recognizes the un-universality of universality. This means knowing that a model does 
not have to be accurate, correct, or useful to be scientific. With this in mind then, the question of the 
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paradigm arises. Namely, what even is meant by paradigm? In theory, the paradigm is that which 
governs what is right and wrong. But as stated before, this understanding of the movement of 
knowledge is itself a paradigm which may be substituted out and considered as faulty—it is provisional 
provisionality.  
 The concept the world is governed by paradigms arises naturally from the Nietzsche 
understanding of perspectives raised by phantomness. But this paradigm of paradigms (paradigmism) 
does not have to be absolute or objective. At first glance, this revealed the provisionality of perspectives 
and methods. This is short-sighted. 
 In the case given, such provisionality is that of perspective and interpretation. But, the concept 
of paradigmism requires more. Its interrogation of itself suggests a provisionality of answers and 
conclusions as well. It is not simply the perspectives that may or may not be correct. The very world that 
is spoken of is provisional, as it too is paradigmatic in nature. This conversely means science is a 
paradigmatic entity. It relies upon the world’s paradigms of itself. Or, the world’s answers to our 
interrogations of it may change to fit the value of the world’s paradigms.  
 In a sense, this paradigmism suggests the world is itself provisional. In essence, the world is 
paradigmatic, as are we. Now a method can be revealed, for what is truly being said is the world is 
uncertain in a way heretofore unimaginable. 
 
(Un)Certain Science 
 Based, then, upon all of this, the answer to scientific methodology in the face of phantom 
problems is that of uncertainty. Specifically the new, viable science is an (Un)Certain Science, one which 
is uncertainly uncertain. This is strange given the lack of the use of certainty throughout. But certainty 
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here simply is a replacement for knowledge and truth. Since truth and knowledge have been utterly 
destroyed by a more complete rendering of phantomness form the Nietzschean lens, these terms 
become meaningful only rhetorically within science. Therefore, something else must be used: certainty. 
This term has previous weight but suffices. Perhaps it is not knowledge or truth that governs science, 
but absolutism. Clearly objectivity has been removed, but absolutism has not been attacked. However, 
without objectivity, how would we ever know if it was truly absolute, truly certain? Thus, (un)certainty. 
 This is all made clear by a reading of Planck’s quantum under a Nietzschean interpretation recast 
into contemporary scientific critique. This perhaps suggests the exact reason Planck was so hesitant to 
establish the quantum paradigm. If, indeed, science is now (un)certain, it would seem it is a pointless 
pursuit. Alas, that is so untrue. Instead, science is given back a potentially higher purpose. If science is 
given free reign to create laws and explore the potential of those creations, then it is no longer 
constrained. It is free to discover all the various truth illusions out there without fear of the nature of 
the current paradigm. 
 But, once again, this too reveals the truly worrisome side. If true, then knowledge and claims to 
truth are fleeting. We must be ready and willing to constantly renegotiate with our drives to truth. 
Specifically, if quantum is just a paradigm, then it too, like any other paradigm, could and probably will 
be replaced. It does not last long and is not truth. This means that at some level, we must accept its 
inability to fulfill our drives to truth. We must be constantly searching. 
 This, revealed by quantum itself, must make us question our world as truth. The world, with 
which we have so long lived enamored with it as truth, ceases to fulfill the truth drive. Quantum makes 
us question the world and quantum itself. It is not a human fault. Instead, the world is acting just as 
illusion. So based on these points there is a certain inevitability: problems, answers, and perspectives 
are provisional. This provisionality is itself provisional. Consequently, science is not about providing a 
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real and accurate world, and is certainly not about discovering more truth. From this, it can be seen that 
the world is not only nonobjective, but constantly (un)certain. 
 If this is true, then the basic premise of science up until now is question. That is, it has been 
believed that the issue with scientific discovery is human inaccuracy. It is the human measurer that 
introduces inaccuracy. This is truistic. It is also incomplete. It is not just human observers. It is also the 
world itself as an anthropomorphized symbol. The world is inaccurate. Therefore, an (Un)Certain 
Science poses a discomforting critique of empiricism: perhaps it is not us who are the problem, but 
world itself. Perhaps the world is never truly ready to reveal herself, and we are always left guessing. 
Perhaps, like Nietzsche’s Sophia, the world has grounds to not reveal itself, but we are always ready to 
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